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This thesis examines Japanese defense policy during the transition period. It 
focuses on Japanese defense expenditures as a medium for comparison between Japanese 
and other countries' defense policies. It also selects the U.S. and the Soviet Union as 
influential allies and adversaries, respectively, of Japan. Using historical data of the three 
countries' defense expenditures, model simulations are performed. The model adopted 
here is the Terasawa and Gates Commitment-Based Model of Defense Allies and 
Adversaries. 
The examination reveals that Japanese defense expenditures in 1983 -1993 may 
have been based on reasons other than selective security considerations related to the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union. It is very clear that the U.S. and the Soviet Union impacted each 
other. 
It is concluded that Japanese defense policy, viewed from the perspective of 
defense expenditures, is difficult to explain in terms of relative power-politics during the 
transition period. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The severe military confrontation between the East and the West, which was called 
the Cold War, is over. Now there is only a remote possibility that a global-scale war may 
happen. However, various regional conflicts due to religious or ethnic discord are 
occurring, and the threat of expanding regional conflicts has increased. Countries around 
the world are searching for new policy which is appropriate for such new international 
situations. 
National defense policy is affected by numerous factors both domestic and 
international. These factors include the nation's domestic political, economic and military 
conditions, and the international relationships among allies and adversaries. While 
domestic factors at times seem arbitrary, external factors relate to the relationships with 
other nations and depend on the fabric of beliefs among nations. 
Former president Bush states, "The relationships that develop among allies and 
adversaries during the transition between the old and new world order will depend 
on the network of beliefs among nations concerning the commitment to cooperative 
or adversarial activities. These beliefs will be affected by numerous factors 
including the national security policy of a nation which contains political, economic 
and military components. The political and military components of the strategy, in 
turn, determine the structure of diplomatic relationships and the military posture and 
actions of a nation, both of which update the beliefs of others. Ultimately, a nation 
develops a reputation for fulfilling its explicit and implicit commitments." [Ref. 3, 
p. 1] 
U.S. national security policy not only influenced the beliefs of other nations 
throughout the Cold War era, but is influential even today because of U.S. military 
superiority and its flexibility of response to changing situations. For example, when the U. 
S. considered that the international security environment had changed with the breakup of 
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization, the U.S. promptly designed a new 
defense policy that places priority on addressing, regional threats around the world. This 
policy was quite different from the policy in effect during the era of Soviet power and 
includes the following four epoch-making principles as its military components. 
• The maintenance of effective strategic deterrence 
• The maintenance of forward deployment 
• The ability to respond to regional and local contingencies 
• Reconstitution of military forces 
In consideration of financial constraints as well as the above stated principles, the 
U.S. defined the necessary capability to maintain security for the U.S. and its allies. The 
U.S. established a minimum base force which will be reconstituted under this new security 
environment. It is needless to say that the beliefs and defense policy of other nations, 
which include members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia , Japan 
and so forth, were also influenced by the new U.S. policy and the changes in its military 
force structure. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine Japanese defense policy, which might have 
an impact on or be affected by other nations' defense policies, from the middle of the 1980s 
to the early 1990s with an emphasis on defense expenditures. To do this, Japanese defense 
expenditures, as well as those of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, will be simulated using a 
modern defense alliance model. 
Following this introduction, the simulation model will be introduced in Chapter II, 
and the data will be provided in Chapter III. A simulation will be performed in Chapter IV, 
and the conclusions summarized in Chapter V. 
II. MODELING 
A.   DEFENSE ALLIANCES MODELS 
National defense is a classic example of a public good in economics. [Ref. 7, p. 
661] Notable characteristics of a public good are nonrivalry and nonexclusiveness. 
Nonrivalry means that the marginal cost of providing the good to an additional consumer is 
zero, and nonexclusiveness means that no one can be excluded from enjoying it. National 
defense is a public good in that it provides both nonrivalous and nonexcludable benefits to 
all people and the nation. 
This public good paradigm may be applied to explain defense expenditures by 
members of defense alliances, as well. 
Terasawa and Gates state, "Alliance members benefit from their allies' defense 
expenditures, and it is impossible for the provider to withhold these benefits. 
Because of these "spill-over" benefits, national defense budgets in individual 
countries reflect the public benefits each country expects to receive from its allies." 
[Ref. l,p. 1] 
Thus, defense alliances may be modeled applying the public goods paradigm. In 
fact, several models have been developed to explain defense expenditures in alliances in the 
real world. NATO is a prime example. It was first modeled using the Pure Public Goods 
Model by Olson and Zeckhauser. This model showed that individuals making independent 
decisions provide public goods until the marginal cost of the last unit they provide equals 
the marginal benefit they receive from that unit. With this model, Olson and Zeckhauser 
concluded that suboptimality and disproportionality are inherent in defense alliances and 
explained NATO members'defense expenditures in 1964. [Ref. 1, p. 2] 
The following model, referred to as the Joint Product Model, was introduced by 
Sandier and Forbes. In this model, defense expenditures provide both public and private 
benefits, depending on the type of weapon systems bought. They noticed that protective 
weapons1 yield private benefits, while deterrent weapons2 give public benefits. An 
increase in private benefits relative to public benefits reduces the incidence of attaining free 
defensive benefits, and should shift the defense burden from a higher GNP country to 
1
 Strategic nuclear weapons are examples of deterrent weapons. 
2
 Tactical nuclear and conventional forces are examples of protective weapons. 
lower ones. [Ref. 1, p. 4] Using this model, they explained the burden shift from the 
U.S. to Western Europe in NATO after the late 1960s. 
The Joint Product Model was modified by Murdoch, Sandier, and Hansen using 
the concept of complementing effects between weapons. They suggest that weapons may 
be either substitutes or complements. They also suggest that deterrent and protective 
weapons among nuclear allies, and conventional weapons among non-nuclear allies, have 
become complementary. If weapons are complementary, alliance members might increase 
defense expenditures as their allies' defense expenditures increase. [Ref. 1, p. 5] They 
found that defense expenditures for many NATO members during the late 1970s and early 
1980s were consistent with the complementary joint product model. 
These are the main alliance models developed earlier in the post-WWII period. 
However, these models have a common feature in that they do not consider differences in 
levels of commitment among allies, nor interactions with adversaries. Although they can 
determine a nation's defense expenditure by the nation's level of GNP and the level of 
defense expenditures by that country's allies, they still have serious limitations in 
explaining defense expenditures in alliances because of their indifference to commitment 
and interactions. [Ref. 1, p. 1] 
Considering commitment within an alliance and interactions between allies and 
adversaries, a Commitment-Based Model of Defense Allies and Adversaries developed by 
Terasawa and Gates succeeded in explaining NATO members' defense expenditures after 
the mid-1960s. This model distinguishes military capability from the commitment to use 
that capability. It also makes the model sensitive to the commitment among allies and 
weakens the relationships between GNP and defense expenditures. The model is tailored to 
effects of adversaries as well as allies because it takes into account that the total impact of 
any change in alliance depends on the reactions of both the other allies and potential 
adversaries. 
In this examination of Japanese defense issues, the levels of commitment in the 
alliance between the U.S. and Japan, and the levels of threat perception among three 
countries including the Soviet Union will be considered. This is a reason for application of 
the Terasawa and Gates, Commitment-Based Model of Defense Allies and Adversaries in 
simulation. 
The following section introduces this model. 
B.   A COMMITMENT-BASED MODEL OF DEFENSE  ALLIES 
AND ADVERSARIES 
The Terasawa-Gates model has three countries, where each country (i) produces a 
non-defense good 
(X;), and a defense good (Y;). The defense good is nonrivalrous in consumption. The 
resource constraint is given by & = Xi + PiYi, where G; denotes its GNP, and Pi is the 
relative price of the defense good measured in terms of the private good. 
The utility functions of Countries One, Two and Three are represented by 
Ui=Ui(Xi,Zx), Ui = Ui(Xi,Zz), U3=Us{X3,Z3), respectively. Z, (i=l, 2, 3) represents 
Country i's consumption of the defense good (Y;) and the benefits it receives from other 
countries (E;jYj): 
(1) Zt-^EyYj    for alii and j, where Et =1 and -1 <.En<;!,  i*j. 
Country j produces Yj of the defense good, but County i perceives that only Ey of Yj is 
relevant to Country i. EyYj, if positive, represents the defense commitment by Country j, 
and if negative, represents the defense threat from Country j. 
In this model, Country One and Two are allies. Because they are allies, the 
countries' level of commitment (E12 and E^) is between zero and one. If Ey = 1, defense 
expenditures by country j are purely public goods. Conversely, if Ey = 0, defense 
expenditures are purely private goods. As Ey varies from one to zero, private benefits 
become relatively more important. 
Country Three is an adversary of Countries One and Two. For adverse countries, 
the level of threat (E13, E^, £3! and E,2) is between zero and minus one. If a country 
perceives that its adversary's defense expenditures are fully committed to potential conflicts 
between the adversary and that county, then Ey equals minus one. If adverse defense 
expenditures are not considered fully credible or if weapons are of inferior quality, and so 
on, the value of Ey is between minus one and zero. [Ref. 1, pp. 9-10] Thus, an Ey matrix 
represents the "world order" regarding defense issues. [Ref. 3, p. 9] 
Country i (i=1,2,3) maximizes its utility subject to its resource constraint, assuming 
a given value for the other countries' defense expenditures and commitment. 
The Nash equilibrium3 may be computed in this framework. 
Next it is useful to illustrate a utility maximizing process, using a Cobb-Douglas 
type of utility function. (Detailed calculation is provided in Appendix A). 
The utility function for maximization is : 
(2) Ui = XiAiZBi 
The coefficients A; and B; represent i's utility elasticity of the private goods and defense 
goods, respectively.   Z, is : 
Z
* " E Ey YJ    for a11 [ and J' where  Ei = l and "1 * E" **'  ** *' 
j 
The corresponding resource constraint is : 
Gt = Xt + PiYt 
With these, each country's reaction function can be derived as : 
(3) Yi- 
Ai 
(A + Bi) im-^v("i]- 
For three countries: 
3
 An equilibrium in which each country selects its optimal defense expenditure while treating other 








—   —   -E21Y1-E23Y3 
\A2/\Pl) 
VA3/VP3/ 
With voluntary and independently determined defense expenditures, Nash 
equilibrium occurs when the countries' reaction functions intersect. This is the only time 
where each country's expectations regarding the other countries' contributions coincide 
with the other countries' actual contributions. 
For easier calculation to get Y;, a matrix form is used . 





Fi + aiEnYi + CI1E13Y3 = b\\ — 
\Pi 
(Gi 
Yi + aiEziYi + aiEnY3 = tn\ — 
Y3 + Cl3E3lYl + Cl3E3zYl = 03 
A Bi 
where at = -7- —-,bi = (A + Bt)'        (A + Bt)' 
The solution for the utility maximizing level of defense expenditure may be shown 
in matrix form as : 
7 
(G 
(    1       aiEn    aiEi3\(Yi\     \     Pi \ 
i ,   Gi. 
Yi   = \bi—\ 
Pi 
Yi Gz 
aiEu       1       aiEis 
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fe— V    ft/ 
In a more explicit form, it is given as : 
(6.A) 
[(1 -aiaiEnEsz)!—)bx + {axaiEuEn- axExi)[ -Abi\ 
Yx= — 
■^{aiaiEnEn - ai£i3) — j bs 
\PI 
(6.B) 
VaimEaE^ - aiEui —)bi+(l- aiasEisEsd —]bt, 
11 \pi) v^y   I 
Yi = -\ 
-^{axaiExiEis - aiEn\ —I m 
(6.C) y3 = — 
D 
^{aiazEixEzi - aiEsi)',—) bx + {cuasExiEsx - asEsz)', —-) bi 
1 I V Pi) \ Pi)     I 
+(l - aiaiEnEn)', —] bz 
where D=l+a1a2a3(E12E23^1+Ei3E21^2) - a^E^ - a1a2E12E21 - a2a3E23E32. 




Data collected for this thesis includes the Gross National Product (GNP) and 
defense expenditures for the U.S., Japan, and the Soviet Union (and Russia4) from 1983 
to 1993. 
The Commitment Based Model of Defense Allies and Adversaries needs data on 
three countries. The three countries consist of two allies and one adversary. In this thesis, 
which examines Japanese defense issues, this translates to one ally and one adversary. Of 
course, the ally is the U.S. and the adversary is the Soviet Union and its successor Russia, 
since the U.S. was the closest partner of Japan and the Soviet Union its strongest 
threatening neighbor throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s. 
Although the model requires many variables, the only variables obtainable from 
actual data are GNP and defense expenditures. In the following simulation, relative value 
of these data to GNP of the U.S. will be used. 
Thus, Table 1 provides the general data table5 for the three countries. Figures 1 and 
2 display the trends of GNP and defense expenditures (absolute values) for each country, 
and Figure 3 shows the ratio of defense expenditures as a percent of GNP for each 
country. 
4
 After the Soviet Union had dissolved in 1991, Russia inherited the Far East region in the vast Soviet 
Union area which adjoins Japan across the sea. 
5
 Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1993-1994 : 1994, published by the United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
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as % of 
GNP 
1983 4,665,000 308,800 6.62 2,932,000 28,630 0.98 2,728,000 355,100 13.02 
1984 5,155,000 321,500 6.24 3,059,000 29,820 0.97 2,750,000 357,600 13.00 
1985 5,304,000 337,800 6.37 3,217,000 31390 0.98 2,771,000 362,700 13.09 
1986 5,450,000 357,900 6.57 3,303,000 32,880 1.00 2,867,000 366,400 12.78 
1987 5,612,000 355,800 6.34 3,446,000 34,580 1.00 2,899,000 374,200 12.91 
1988 5,837,000 348,500 5.97 3,661,000 36,250 0.99 2,982,000 379300 12.72 
1989 5,993,000 346,000 5.77 3,838,000 37,700 0.98 3,010,000 344,800 11.46 
1990 6,071,000 333,900 5.50 4,021,000 39,130 0.97 2,901,000 318,400 10.98 
1991 6,029,000 294,400 4.88 4,193,000 40,460 0.% 2,659,000 273,100 10.27 
1992 6,157,000 311,800 5.06 4,250,000 41330 0.97 870,600 145,400 16.70 
1993 6,348,000 297,600 4.69 4,260,000 41,730 0.98 777,400 113,800 14.64 
Table 1. GNP and defense expenditures for three countries during 1983 ~ 1993 
(Millions of 1993 dollar) 
12 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
Figure 1. GNP for three countries during 1983 ~ 1993 
GNP is a realistic measure of the national power of each country and provides for 
an excellent comparison with other countries. 
In Figure 1, we can see that : 
• U.S. GNP and Japanese GNP increased at a rate of 3.1 percent and 3.8 percent, 
respectively. 
• Japanese GNP was about two third of the U.S. GNP during that time period. 
• Soviet GNP was almost constant during 1983 ~ 1991. 
• Accordingly, differences in the amount between the Soviet GNP and the U.S. 
GNP, and between the Soviet GNP and Japanese GNP, were increasing with years. 


















1983     1984      1985     1986      1987     1988     1989     1990     1991      1992      1993 
Year 
Figure 2. Defense expenditures (absolute value) 
for three countries during 1983 ~ 1993 
Defense expenditures are equivalent to an amount of goods provided to defend 
one's own country and an ally. Although defense expenditures are interesting figures to 
analyze, they vary widely according to a countries' economic scales, and it is dangerous to 
simply compare one with another. 
In Figure 2, we can see that : 
• The U.S defense expenditures increased at a rate of 5 percent during 1983 ~ 
1986, but decreased at a rate of 2.6 percent after that time. 
• The U.S. defense expenditures surpassed the Soviet defense expenditures in 
1989. 
• Defense expenditures in the Soviet Union increased at a rate of 1.3 percent until 
1988, but decreased at a rate of 10 percent after that time. 
• Russian defense expenditures were less than half of the U.S. defense 
expenditures, and steadily decreased. 
14 
• On the other hand, Japanese defense expenditures increased at a rate of 3.8 
percent during that time period. 
• Japanese defense expenditures were about 10 percent of the U.S defense 
expenditures during the 1980s, but increased to about 14 percent in the early 1990s. 
®  12.0 
»  10.0 
M 
« 
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Figure 3. Defense expenditures (as % of GNP) 
for three countries during 1983 ~ 1993 
The ratio of defense expenditures as a percent of GNP adds important information 
to that of Figure 2. With this ratio, we can measure how much GNP a country devotes to 
own defense and how much it shoulders defense burden in an alliance. 
In Figure 3, we see that : 
• Ratios of the U.S. defense expenditures as a percent of GNP decreased from 
6.57 percent to 4.69 percent in seven years after 1986. 
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• Ratios of the Soviet defense expenditures as a percent of GNP decreased from 
12.72 percent to 10.27 percent in four years after 1987. 
• Ratios of Russian defense expenditures as a percent of GNP decreased from 16.7 
percent to 14.64 percent during one year (1992 ~ 1993). 
• On the other hand, Japanese ratios of defense expenditures were a constant 1 
percent during the entire period. 
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IV.    SIMULATION 
The purpose of this thesis includes an examination of military conditions 
surrounding Japan during 1983 ~ 1993. Military conditions are important factors that 
determined Japanese defense expenditures during that time. Factors include Japanese 
defense strategy, the amount of GNP and/or the situation of the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union. A Commitment-Based Model of Defense Allies and Adversaries will be applied 
using these variables, such as Aj.P; and Eir Particularly, Et- (levels of commitments 
between allies and perceived threat among adversaries) is a main variable which relates to 
military conditions. Thus, a goal in the following simulations is to derive Ey for the three 
countries during 1983~1993. 
The simulation is composed of three parts. The first one is a simulation by 
spreadsheet analysis and the second one is a simulation by regression analysis. These 
analyses will be done under the Nash equilibrium. The last one is also a simulation by 
regression analysis, but in this case, the Leader - Follower situation6 is assumed instead of 
the Nash equilibrium. 
Results of the simulations will be provided in the next three sections, and they will 
be summarized in the next chapter. The detailed processes of calculations and whole tables 
of results for each simulation are included as appendices. 
A. SIMULATION BY SPREADSHEET ANALYSIS 
As demonstrated in.the previous chapter, three countries' reaction functions for a 




(l - aiaiErsEiiY, —) b\ + (aiaiEnEzi- a\En)\ —) b 
\Y \pj \Pt) 
2 
/ (~~* \ 
-UaiaiEnEn - aifi.3) —| bs v \ Pi) 
6
 In the Leader - Follower situation a Leader who has all information for deciding his strategy and 




II \ pi) V/V     I 
-I I 
■daxaiEnEiz- aiE-ai — 03 
AP3/ 
r^uJ 
F3 = — 
{aiOiEuEsi - a^Esi)', —j bi + {avmEiiEn - asEsiy, —j b 
+(l - aiaiEnEixy, —1 b3 
v V Pi) 
A       , ß. 
where a> = — rr,& = (A + Ä)'       (A+ß,)' 
Variables included in these three functions are 
*  x T   *   xr   * 
• Known variables     : GPG2,G3 and Yj ,Y2 ,Y3 , 
• Unknown variables : a1,a2,a3,b1,b2,b3,P1,P2,P3,E12,E13,E21,E23E31,E32. 
Because there are too many unknown variables, it was necessary to set several 
conditions to simplify the spreadsheets. These conditions are: 
• The utility elasticity of the non-defense goods for three countries are equal and 
fixed7.(A1=A2=A3=0.4) 
• The utility elasticity of defense goods for Japan is fixed. (B2=0.1) Those for the 
U-S-CBJ and the Soviet Union(B3) are adjusted respectively so that simulated^*) and 
actual defense expenditures(Y;) are equal for all three countries. 
7
 Fixed numbers, 4=0.4 and B2=0.1, are the fittest ones gained by spreadsheet analyses. 
18 
• The relative price of defense goods measured in terms of non-defense goods for 
three countries is fixed8.(P1=P2=P3=1.0) 
• Perceived threat for the U.S.(from the Soviet Union) and for the Soviet Union 
(from the U.S. and Japan) are equal (not fixed) (E13=E31=E32)9. 
With these conditions and the given values of the three countries' GNPs(G1,G2 and 
G3), a simulation will be performed for every year10. An example of the spreadsheets 
follows : 
8
 It was assumed there are no differences in relative prices between defense and private goods for three 
countries. 
9
 It was assumed the U.S. and the Soviet Union perceive the same level of threat with each other, and the 
Soviet Union recognizes that the threat from Japan is equal to the threat from the U.S., because, while 
Japan does not have explicit aggressive weapons, it supports the U.S. expeditionary force by all measures. 
10
 Although the spreadsheet in this simulation still has seven variables, that is, E12,E21 E^ .E^Ej^E,^ 
andY,*, Y2*,Y3*, simulated Y,\ Y2* and Y3* will be equated with actual Y„Y2 and Y3. As a result, there are 
four variables in the model eventually. 
19 
1987 
l A; Bi P. G a, b, Y, GNP DE 
1  (U.S.) 0.4 0.0103 1.0 10.0 0.97 0.03 0.63 5612000 355800 
2 (Japan) 0.4 0.01 1.0 6.1 0.98 0.02 0.06 3446000 34580 
3 (USSR) 0.4 0.0233 1.0 5.2 0.94 0.06 0.67 2899000 374200 
Ej2 El3 E2i En E31 E32 D Y,-   | v." 1 Y,* 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.68 0.99 1.23 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.68 0.88 1.17 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.67 0.77 1.10 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.66 0.66 1.04 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.66 0.56 0.97 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.65 0.45 0.91 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.65 0.35 0.85 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.64 0.25 0.79 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.63 0.15 0.73 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.63 0.06 0.67 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.62 -0.04 0.62 
0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.68 0.99 1.23 
0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.54 1.00 1.16 
0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.55 0.91 1.11 
0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.38 0.55 0.82 1.06 
0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.38 0.56 0.72 1.01 
0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.37 0.57 0.62 0.96 
0.4 -0.6 0.6 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.36 0.58 0.52 0.91 
0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.36 0.59 0.41 0.85 
0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.35 0.60 0.30 0.80 
0.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.35 0.61 0.19 0.74 
0.4 -0.6 1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.34 0.62 0.08 0.68 
Table 2. Example of Spreadsheets (An extract from Spreadsheets for 1987) 
When simulated defense expenditures (Y;*) are equal to actual defense expenditures 
(Yj) for all three countries(Y1*=Y1,Y2*=Y2,Y3*=Y3) by adjusted B, and B3, the simulated 
commitments between allies (E12 and EJ and perceived threats among adversaries (E23 and 
E13=E31=E32) will be solved to explain military conditions around Japan. In Table 2, when 
B, = 0.0103 and B3 = 0.0233, the solutions are E12=0.3, ^,=0.9, E23=-0.7 and 
E13=E31=E32=-0.6 to explain Y1= 0.63, Y2=0.06 and Y30.67 in 1987. 
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The definitions of Etj once again are as follows : 
E12: The level of Japanese commitment which the U.S. perceived. 
E13: The level of the Soviet threat which the U.S. perceived. 
EJJ : The level of the U.S.  commitment which Japan perceived. 
Ej3: The level of the Soviet threat which Japan perceived. 
Ejj: The level of the U.S. threat which the Soviet Union perceived. 
EJJ : The level of Japanese threat which the Soviet Union perceived. 
These definitions of Ey may be easily displayed in a table. 
U.S. Japan U.S.S.R 
U.S. — Ei, F 
Japan Eii — E.3 
U.S.S.R En E,2 — 
Table 3. Combinations of Ey 
Moreover, the interpretations of the sign(+,-) and value of Ey are as follows : 
• Ej. between zero and one( 0 < Ey £ 1) means a commitment in an alliance, and the 
greater Ey is, the greater the level of commitment becomes. 
• Ey between minus one and zero ( -1 < Ey < 0) means a threat with adversaries, 
and the greater negative value Ey is, the greater the level of threat. 
21 
Thus, the solutions of Table 2 may be expressed in a table as follows 
U.S. Japan U.S.S.R 
U.S. — 0.3 -0.6 
Japan 0.9 — -0.7 
U.S.S.R -0.6 -0.6 — 
Table 4. Example of solutions in the E;j table 
Table 4 shows that in 1987 : 
• The U.S. perceived the Japanese commitment as 0.3. 
• The U.S. perceived the Soviet threat as -0.6. 
• Japan perceived the U.S. commitment as 0.9. 
• Japan perceived the Soviet threat as -0.7. 
• The Soviet Union perceived the U.S. threat as -0.6. 
• The Soviet Union perceived the Japanese threat as -0.6. 
All solutions of the simulation during 1983 ~ 1993 are as follows : 
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E21 E23 E12 E32-E13=E31 
1983 0.6 -0.4 0.4 -0.6 
1984 0.8 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 
1985 0.9 -0.7 0.3 -0.6 
1986 0.9 -0.7 0.3 -0.6 
1987 0.9 -0.7 0.3 -0.6 
1988 0.8 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 
1989 0.4 -0.2 0.3 -0.6 
1990 0.4 -0.2 0.3 -0.6 
1991 0.3 -0.1 0.3 -0.6 
1992 0.4 -0.4 0.3 -0.4 
1993 0.4 -0.5 0.3 -0.3 
Table 5. Simulated E;j during 1983 -1993 
23 






















1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
.^\ 





Figure 4. Trends of E;j during 1983 ~ 1993 
Based on an analysis of these results, the following three points may be made : 
a. There was a reduction in adversarial intensity between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union/ Russia post-1991(E13=E31=E32 negative value decreased.). This reduction was 
related to the events leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
b. There was a reduction in how the Japanese perceived the U.S. commitments 
and the Soviet / Russian threats post-1987 (E^ and E^ went down.). These reductions 
resulted from a decrease in Soviet defense expenditures (absolute value) after 1988 and a 
reversal of defense expenditures between the Soviet Union and the U.S. after 1989. 
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c. There was a reemergence of Japanese perceived threat from Russia post- 
1991(E23 negative value rose.). This was caused in graet part by a reduction in adversarial 
intensity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia. 
25 
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B. SIMULATION BY REGRESSION ANALYSIS (A) 
The spreadsheet analysis completed in the previous section has limitations in 
explaining defense expenditures because of its a priori restrictions on A;, B;, P; and E^. 
Although these restrictions are not unreasonable and E^'s are selected to be consistent with 
the data, the simulation results cannot be used without sufficient consideration of the 
limitations. Particularly, the conditions for B; and E:j in that Bx and B3 are adjusted so that 
simulated Y;* and actual Y; are equal for all three countries while B2 is fixed. The 
perceptions of threats except for Japan (E23), are equated with one another (E13=E31=E32), 
which can seriously affect the results. 
Regression analysis will be applied to reduce the limitations by freeing, not fixing, 
all the parameters. However, it cannot be helped that some values in the reaction functions 
for the Nash equilibrium are approximated in the process of making a regression model 
using this method. 
The process of applying a regression model is provided below. 





1|V \pj \Pi)    I 
+[aiaiEnEz3 - aiEu), —)fo 
V P3J 
1_|V    . \pi) VJV    I 
^{aiaiEnEti- aiEnj, — £3 
{aiOhEivEzi - a3£3i) —) b\ + (aiasEnEn - aiEn)', —) bi 
1 y XPJ V Pi)   \ 
+(l - aiaiEnEi\)\ —) bs v \PJ 
where        D=l+ a1a2a3(E12E23E31+E13E21E32) - a^E^Ejj - a1a2E12E21 
' ^^ßl3^31 
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Approximation for the regression model is defined as follows : 
• From the definitions of a Cobb-Douglas function and E.j; absolute values of all 
a,, b( and E^ are less than zero. Therefore, a.aE^ and a^aE^E^ in the above functions 
become very small and are approximate zero. 
With this approximation, the functions (6.A), (6.B) and (6.C) are transformed to 
three regression models as follows : 
(7.A) Yi = (61)— - (biaiEn) -f - (feai£i3)— Pi Pi "3 
C C Ci 
(7.B) Yi = (bi) — -{biazEii)— - (haiEx)— 
Pi P\ P3 
(7.C) 73 = (fo) (biasEsi)— - (biasEn) -f- 
Because G; and Y; are given by actual data , three multiple regression models are 
prepared with three independent variables (one b; and two b^E^) respectively. P; assumes 
a value dependent on the particular country. 
Table 6 provides data for the regression analysis11 and Table 7 shows output from 
the three regression models (7.A), (7.B) and (7.C)12. 
1
'   In Table 6., each series of data is smoothed by the moving average method. 
12
   P,, P2 and P3 are assumed to be one. 
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Year G./P, G2/P2 G3/P3 Y, Y2 Y3 
1983 10.00 6.1096 5.5912 0.6428 0.0596 0.7274 
1984 10.00 6.0948 5.4689 0.6408 0.0595 0.7129 
1985 10.00 6.0199 5.2732 0.6391 0.0591 0.6833 
1986 10.00 6.0887 5.2169 0.6425 0.0604 0.6743 
1987 10.00 6.1577 5.1784 0.6292 0.0614 0.6630 
1988 10.00 6.2722 5.0990 0.6028 0.0622 0.6306 
1989 10.00 6.4332 4.9699 0.5748 0.0632 0.5832 
1990 10.00 6.6607 4.7371 0.5385 0.0648 0.5176 
1991 10.00 6.8269 3.5343 0.5149 0.0662 0.4045 
1992 10.00 6.8561 2.3497 0.4878 0.0667 0.2895 
1993 10.00 6.8067 1.3193 0.4876 0.0664 0.2077 




Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.006 
df ss MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.041 0.014 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 0.000 4E-05 
Total 11 0.041 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
bt 0.1536 0.008 18.66 7E-08 0.135 0.173 
b2aiEi2 -0.1558 0.011 -13.82 7E-07 -0.182 -0.130 
bsaiEu 0.0094 0.003 3.532 8E-03 0.003 0.016 
(7.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.848 
Standard Error 0.000 
df ss MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-05 119 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
bia2E2i 0.0009 0.001 1.455 0.184 -0.001 0.002 
b2 0.0084 0.001 9.804 1E-05 0.006 0.010 
b3a2E23 -0.0001 0.000 -0.395 0.703 -0.001 0.000 
(7.C) 
Multiple R 0.998 
R Square 0.996 
Adjusted R Square 0.871 
Standard Error 0.012 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.318 0.106 748 4E-09 
Residual 8 0.001 0.000 
Total 11 0.319 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b^Esi 0.1416 0.015 9.262 2E-05 0.106 0.177 
b2a3E:ß -0.1938 0.021 -9.254 2E-05 -0.242 -0.146 
b, 0.0850 0.005 17.15 1E-07 0.074 0.096 
Table 7. Output of the original condition (A) 
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I calculate at, b; and E,j from output data in Table 7. 
Yt :    bi = 0.1536,   b^E,^  0.1558 
at 
13
 = 0.8464,b3aiE13 = - 0.0094 
E12 = 21.8413 
E13 = -0.1310 
Y2 :     b2 = 0.0084,   b^E^ = - 0.0009 
^ = 0.9916,    b3a2E23=   0.0001 
Ej! = - 0.0060 
£23=   0.0010 
Y3 :     b3 = 0.0850,   b^E,^-0.1416 
33 = 0.9150,    b2a3^2=   0.1938 
E31 = - 1.0076 
E,2 = 25.1270 
These E^ are inserted into the Etj table. 
U.S. Japan U.S.S.R 
U.S. — (21.8413) -0.1310 
Japan (-0.0060) — (0.0010) 
U.S.S.R -1.0076 (25.1270) — 
Table 8. Eij in Regression (A 1) 
Before analyzing calculated Ey, the output data in Table 7 may be tested using a 
Statistical Fitness approach. 
F-Test is a test to determine whether there is a regression relationship between Y; 
and the set of (Gj / P;) in each model by using the F distribution, t -Test examines whether 
the relationship between Y; and individual regression coefficients is significant by using the 
t distribution. Assuming a risk is 0.05, decision rules of both tests are : 
13
  From the definitions of ^ and b; (see the equations (6. A) ~ (6.C)), I can get an equation ap 1 - b;. 
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•   F-Test :      If F> 4.07, a regression relationship exists14. 
is 
•   ^-Test :      U \t \ > 2.306, a coefficient is fit13. 
With these decision rules, the output of Table 7 may be interpreted as follows : 
• Because all F are greater than 4.07, there is a regression relationship between Y; 
and the set of (G; / P;) in each model, 
• Because all t statistics except those for b^Ej, and b3a2E23 are greater than 
2.306, there is a significant regression relationship between Y; and individual regression 
coefficients in each model except coefficients of b^Ej, (=0.0009)and b3a2E23 (=-0.0001). 
That is, (0.0009) and (-0.0001) are unreliable coefficients statistically. 
Thus, four results from the simulation are : 
• E21 and Ej3 should be excluded from further analyses because related coefficients 
are unreliable, 
• A fit value for the model is only E13. 
• E12 and E,t values are acceptable in terms of sign (+ or -) . but the magnitude is 
problematic because the absolute value of Ey should be less than or equal to one. 
• Although t -statistics is satisfactory, a sign of E^ is wrong and the reverse of the 
one in the original model. It should be negative to reflect the adversarial relation between 
the two countries. 
14
 From F table, F(0.95,3,8)=4.07. Calculated F=330.4, 118.8 and 748.2 > 4.07. 
15
 From t table, T(0.975,8)=2.306. Calculated 1  | =18.7, 13.8, 3.5, 9.8, 9.3, 9.3 and 17.1 > 2.306, but 
1.45 and 0.39 < 2.306. 
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Additionally, other regression runs were conducted using different values for Y; 
and P;16. If only a part of the U.S. and the Soviet defense expenditures affect military 
circumstances around Japan, (50 percent, for example), then the original Y, and Y3 should 
be multiplied by 0.5. One might argue that the relative prices are different among three 
countries, reflecting the different efficiency of their defense industries vis ä vis the civilian 
sector. For example, the Soviet Union might be more efficient in producing military goods 
than civilian goods while Japan might be more efficient in producing civilian goods than 
military goods. In such an example, the original P3 could be reduced while P2 could be 
increased. 
Table 9 shows an regression output with these new assumptions on Y; and P; 17. 
16
 Because these changes are proportional among data series, they don't affect F and t statistics at all. 
17
 The less the part of the U.S. and the Soviet defense expenditures affect, the more E12 and E,, approach a 
fit value. In this case a fifteen percent reduction is taken from the data of William W. Kaufman. [Ref 6.] 
On the other hand, because the change in P2 and P3 values of Ey not hardly affect values of Ey, P( are kept 
equal to one. 
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(7.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
RSquare 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.001 0.000 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 7E-06 9E-07 
Total 11 0.001 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
bx 0.0230 0.001 18.66 7E-08 0.020 0.026 
b2a1Ei2 -0.0234 0.002 -13.82 7E-07 -0.027 -0.019 
bjaiEu 0.0014 0.000 3.532 0.008 0.000 0.002 
(7.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.848 
Standard Error 0.000 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-05 119 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b^Ezi 0.0009 0.001 1.455 0.184 -0.001 0.002 
b2 0.0084 0.001 9.804 1E-05 0.006 0.010 
b3a2E23 -8E-05 0.000 -0.395 0.703 -0.001 0.000 
(7.C) 
Multiple R 0.998 
R Square 0.996 
Adjusted R Square 0.871 
Standard Error 0.002 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.007 0.002 748 4E-09 
Residual 8 3E-05 3E-06 
Total 11 0.007 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
bia3E3i 0.0212 0.002 9.262 2E-05 0.016 0.027 
b2a3E32 -0.0291 0.003 -9.254 2E-05 -0.036 -0.022 
b3 0.0128 0.001 17.15 1E-07 0.011 0.014 
Table 9. Output of the fittest condition (A) 
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Calculated E^ are: 
Yx :     t>! = 0.0230, b^E^   0.0234 
a, = 0.9770, b3a1E13 = - 0.0014 
Y2 :     b2 = 0.0084, b^Ej, = - 0.0009 
32 = 0.9916, b3a2E23=   0.0001 
Y3 :     b3 = 0.0128, b^E^ = -0.0212 
33 = 0.9872, b2a,E,2=   0.0291 
E12 = 2.8382 
F    = 013 -0.1135 
^ = - 0.0400 
^23 = 0.0064 
E„ = - 0.9338 
£32 = 3.4932 
In the E,j table 
U.S. Japan U.S.S.R 
U.S. — (2.83823) -0.11349 
Japan (-0.03997) — (0.00636) 
U.S.S.R -0.93382 (3.49318) — 
Table 10. Eij in Regression (A2) 
Because statistical tests remain the same as those in the first case, E^ and E^ are 
still unreliable, and the sign of E,2 is unsatisfactory. Both E13 and £3! fall within the 
acceptable range of the values. 
Although conditions for the regression analyses were varied, the commitment 
coefficients involving Japan (E^, E^, E12, E,2) remain outside the acceptable range of 
values. The level of Japanese defense expenditures in 1983 - 1993 period are not explained 
by the interactive commitment model involving adversaries. However, the simulation of 
regression models shows that there is quite a disparity in the levels of perceived threat 
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between the U.S. and the Soviet Union / Russia. The U.S. perception of Russian threat is 
much smaller than that of Russia toward the U. S. 
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C. SIMULATION BY REGRESSION ANALYSIS (B) 
The two previous simulations were done using the Nash equilibrium. The third 
simulation in this thesis will be performed using a Leader - Follower framework. In a 
Leader - Follower framework, a Leader estimates the reaction functions of follower 
countries and decides his strategy, and Followers make a decision based on the Leaders' 
decision. While each country can do its best given what the other countries do in a Nash 
equilibrium case, a Leader can do his best with information of the world and the Followers 
can only make a choice based on the influence of the Leader. In the real world where all 
nations never have an equal ability in economics, diplomacy and military leadership, a 
Leader - Follower model probably is more applicable than a Nash equilibrium. 
It seems quite natural that in a relationship between the U.S. and Japan, the U.S. is 
a Leader and Japan is a Follower because of their political and economic relationships. 
Thus, the simulation using regression models in the prior section will be modified 
from a Nash equilibrium case to a Leader - Follower situation. 
Assuming Country One is a Leader and Countries Two and Three are Followers, 
the equations (4.A) and (4.B) provide the reaction functions for Followers before 




\ Ail \ Pi) 
—    —   - E31Y1 - E32Y2 
\ As) \ PsJ 
Using a, and b; instead of Aj and B; : 
JG2 (8.A) Yi = (bi)\—) -{aiEn)Yx- (aiEn)Yz 
(8.B) y3 = (fe/—) -(fl3£3i)Fi -(aaE^Yi 
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where a. = -. -,bt = (A + Bi)'        (A + Bi)' 
By the substitution between the equations (8.B) and (8.C), reaction functions for 
Followers are expressed in terms of Y,. 
(£2) [aiEi- aiasEzsEsujYi - (aibsEn) — 
1 - axtiEisEii 
/"-* (~* 
(bi) (a-sEn- aiOiEuEsijYi- (oibiEii)— 
1 - aicisErsE-ii 
On the other hand, a function for a Leader is obtained by the maximization of the 
original utility function (2). The utility function and the resource constraint for a Leader are 
as follows : 
(10) Ui=XiMZiBi 
subject to Gi-Xi-PiYi = 0 
where Zi = Yi + En Yi + E13Y3 
Using the Lagrangean function and the Followers' reaction functions (9.A) and (9.B), 




   ' Pi 
\{A\biEn - AiasbiEuEsi)-^ + (Aifefo - AiaibsEnEzi)—\ 
(u\[ *2 "3J 
^ "       
J
 Bi - BiaiasEisEii - BiaiEnEn + BiaiaiEnEizE-n^ 
-BiasEizE3\ + BiaiazEuEixEii J 
The functions for the Leader and Followers, (9. A), (9.B) and (11), are transformed 
into the regression models for the three countries by the similar approximation used in the 
Nash case. 
fi J~I /~* 
(12.A) Y\ = (bx)— -{biaxEn)— -(fcafis)—- 
v
       ' Pi Pi Ps 
(12.B) Yi = {bi)—-{aiEu)Yi-{haiET3)— 
(12.C) F3 = (&)— - (o3£3i)ri- (biasEsi)-^ 
P3 Pi 
Because of a Leader - Follower case, the Leader's model (12.A) is expressed by 
three countries' GNPdataCGj/P;), while the Followers' models, (12.B) and (12.C), have 
data on the Leader's defense expenditure (Y,) instead of GNP. It is interesting that, by the 
approximation, the parameters for the Leader's model (fy a, Etj) become the same as those 
for the Nash case (7.A). 
In simulation, various conditions from the previous regression analysis were used. 
Additionally, it was assumed that the U.S. is the leader, and Japan and the Soviet Union / 
Russia are the followers. Results of the two cases are provided for comparison with the 
results of the Nash equilibrium. 
An output with the original condition18 is as follows : 
Y; and Y3 don't change and P;s are equal to one. 
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(12.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.006 
df ss MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.041 0.014 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 0.000 4E-05 
Total 11 0.041 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b, 0.15364 0.008 18.7 7E-08 0.135 0.173 
b2aJEu -0.15584 0.011 -13.8 7E-07 -0.182 -0.130 
b3a,E,3 0.00943 0.003 3.532 0.008 0.003 0.016 
(12.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.847 
Standard Error 0.000 
df ss MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-05 117 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b2 0.0094 2E-04 40.62 1E-10 0.009 0.010 
D3ä^23 -0.0001 2E-04 -0.510 0.624 -0.001 4E-04 
Stz^2l 0.0057 0.004 1.389 0.202 -0.004 0.015 
(12.C) 
Multiple R 0.999 
R Square 0.998 
Adjusted R Square 0.873 
Standard Error 0.008 
df ss MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.318 0.106 1498 3E-10 
Residual 8 0.001 7E-05 
Total 11 0.319 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b2a^n -0.0507 0.004 -12.9 1E-06 -0.060 -0.042 
b3 0.0758 0.004 18.6 7E-08 0.066 0.085 
a3E31 0.9325 0.070 13.4 9E-07 0.772 1.093 
Table 11. Output of the original condition (B) 
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Calculated E;  are 
Y, :     b, = 0.1536, b2a,E12   =   0.1558 
at = 0.8464, b3a,E13   = - 0.0094 
Y2 :     b2 = 0.0094, a2E21    =-0.0057 
32 = 0.9906, b3a2E23=   0.0001 
Y3 :     b3 = 0.0758, ^E,,    =-0.9325 
33 = 0.9242, b2a3^2=   0.0507 
F = 
^12 19.6471 
E = -0.1470 
E» = - 0.0057 
^23 = 0.0016 
^ = - 1.0089 
Z>z = 5.8557 
U.S. Japan U.S.S.R 
U.S. — (19.6471) -0.1470 
Japan (-0.0057) — (0.0016) 
U.S.S.R -1.0089 (5.8557) — 
Table 12. Eij in Regression (B1) 
The fittest condition in a Leader- Follower situation is the fifteen percent reduction 
of Yj and Y3 19, the same as the Nash equilibrium. An output is : 
PjS are still equal to one. 
41 
(12.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.001 3E-04 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 7E-06 9E-07 
Total 11 0.001 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
bt 0.0230 0.001 18.7 7E-08 0.020 0.026 
b2aiEi2 -0.0234 0.002 -13.8 7E-07 -0.027 -0.019 
bja,Eu 0.0014 4E-04 3.532 0.008 5E-04 0.002 
(12.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.847 
Standard Error 0.000 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-05 117 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b2 0.0094 2E-04 40.62 1E-10 0.009 0.010 
b3a2E23 -0.0001 2E-04 -0.510 0.624 -0.001 4E-04 
ajEji 0.0378 0.027 1.389 0.202 -0.025 0.100 
(12.C) 
Multiple R 0.999 
R Square 0.998 
Adjusted R Square 0.873 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.007 0.002 1498 3E-10 
Residual 8 1E-05 2E-06 
Total 11 0.007 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b2a3E32 -0.0076 0.001 -12.9 1E-06 -0.009 -0.006 
b3 0.0114 0.001 18.6 7E-08 0.010 0.013 
ajE,i 0.9325 0.070 13.4 9E-07 0.772 1.093 
Table 13. Output of the fittest condition (B) 
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Calculated E.  are 
Yt :     bt = 0.0230 b2atE12   =   0.0234 
a, = 0.9770, b3a1E13    = - 0.0014 
Y2 :     b2 = 0.0094, a.E,,    =-0.0378 
32 = 0.9906, b^E^   0.0001 
Y3 :     b3 = 0.0114,       aß,, = - 0.9325 
33 = 0.9886, b233E32=   0.0076 
E12 = 2.5531 
E13 = -0.1274 
E» = - 0.0381 
£.3 = 0.0108 
£3,= - 0.9432 
£3,= 0.8211 
U.S. Japan U.S.S.R 
U.S. — (2.5531) -0.1274 
Japan (-0.0381) — (0.0108) 
U.S.S.R -0.9432 (0.8211) — 
case20. 
Table 14. Eij in Regression (B2) 
Decision rules for two statisticsl tests are the same as those in the Nash Equilibrium 
• F-Test :     If F> 4.07, a regression relation exists. 
• r-Test :      If I? I > 2.306, a coefficient is fit. 
20
 Because degrees of Freedom between the two simulations are the same, F and / distributions for decision 
rules are the same as well. 
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With these rules, it may be concluded that the trend in the results on a Leader - 
Follower situation is the same as that on the Nash equilibrium in general. The trend is again 
as follows : 
• Except for two coefficients a^, and b3a2E23 , there is a regression relationship 
in each coefficient, and sets of them, statistically, 
• E13 and E„ are fit to the Commitment Based Model of Defense Allies and 
Adversaries when Yl and Y3 are reduced to fifteen percent of their full amounts, 
• The other Etj without E13 and E,, may be affected by Y2. 
Although one coefficient for (9.B) deteriorates in comparison with those of the 
Nash equilibrium, all coefficients for (9.C) and two coefficients for (9.B) improve to the 
contrary. This means that the regression models for followers (9.B) and (9.C) are fitter 
than the regression models for the Nash case. 
Thus, the results of the analysis of the simulation in this section are as follows : 
a. Japanese defense expenditures do not conform to the Commitment-Based Model 
of Defense Allies and Adversaries on a Leader - Follower situation. 
b. However, a Leader - Follower situation better fitts to the three countries in the 
Commitment Based Model of Defense Allies and Adversaries than the Nash case. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the simulation using spreadsheets may be summarized as follows   : 
• Reduction in adversarial intensity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union/ Russia 
occurred post-1991(E13=E31=E32 negative value decreased.). This reduction was related to 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
• Reduction is evident in how the Japanese perceived the U.S. commitments and 
the Soviet / Russian threats post 1987 (E21 and E^ went down.). These reductions 
resulted from a decrease in the Soviet defense expenditures (absolute value) after 1988 and 
the inversion of superiority between the Soviet Union and the U.S. in the amount of 
defense expenditures after 1989. 
• Reemergence of Japanese perceived threats from Russia occurred post-1991(E23 
negative value rose.). This was caused by a reduction in adversarial intensity between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia. 
During 1983-1993 the levels of commitments and threats among the three countries 
fluctuated according to changes in the international security environment and defense 
expenditures in the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia. However, an odd fact of Japanese 
defense expenditures in Figures 2 and 3 should be noted. It is that Japanese defense 
expenditures, both in an absolute amount and as a percent of GNP, were not affected by 
these dramatic changes, while the U.S. and the Soviet/Russian defense expenditures were 
clearly affected. As shown in Chapter II, the amount of Japanese defense expenditures 
increased at a rate of 3.8 percent constantly throughout these years and the ratio of Japanese 
defense expenditures as a percent of GNP was constant at 1.0 percent. 
Similar results are derived from Nash-based regression model as well as Leader - 
Follower-based regression model. Observations from the analyses are as follows : 
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• Japanese defense expenditures cannot be explained by the Commitment Based 
Model of Defense Allies and Adversaries using Nash or Leader - Follower frameworks. 
• Japanese defense expenditures in 1983 ~ 1993 may have been based on reasons 
other than selective security considerations related to the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union/Russia, while the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia clearly impacted each other. 
The Commitment-Based Model of Defense Allies and Adversaries reveals that 
Japanese defense policy viewed from the perspective of defense expenditures is difficult to 
explain in terms of relative power-politics during the transition period of this era. 
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APPENDIX A. CALCULATION OF A COMMITMENT- 
BASED MODEL OF DEFENSE ALLIES 
AND ADVERSARIES 
The equation (2) have been employed as a utility function with its corresponding 
resource constraint. 
Ux = XiAiZiB' 
subject to        d - Xt - PiYi = 0 
where Z = Y EyYj 
j 
To maximize the utility function (2), the Lagrangean-function is used. 
L-Xi^Zf' + XiGi-Xi-PiYi) 
By differentiation with respect to X;, Y; and X, three equations are prepared as follows : 
® Lxi=ZB'Ai(xf1 -A = 0 
© LH = XAfiZ,flM - XPi = 0 
® LA = G - X:~ PiYi = 0 
Dividing ® by ©, results in ; 
Xi        Zi    AiXi A 
Lr,     XiAiBiZB"1     XPi 
_ ML__ _1_ 
=




is transformed by' 
Gi — Xi Gi        AiZi Gi        Ai -<ry 
Y, = = . — - — > EjYj 
Pi        Pi      Bi      Pi    Bi Y 
Pl    Bi 
Bi     pt   a £j 
,A,     Ai\       „(Bi+Ai\      Gi     AiVrv 
\A + Bi) Pi    [A 
—)y. 
where  ^EyYj = Y + ^EyYj 
j i*j 
Finally, the equation (3) is obtained as : 
[At+Bi\ 
1   ,. as-H^ 
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APPENDIX B.   RESULTS OF SPREADSHEET ANALYSIS 
i A B, P, a ai h Y. GNP DE 
1  (U.S.) 0.4 0.01 1.0 10.0 0.98 0.02 0.66 4655000 308800 
2(Japan) 0.4 0.01 1.0 6.3 0.98 0.02 0.06 2932000 28630 
3 (USSR) 0.4 0.0253 1.0 5.8 0.94 0.06 0.76 2728000 355100 
Eu 1   ^   1 E,, 1    E,j ft. E» D Y'"   1 v.    I Y3' 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.51 0.70 0.57 1.06 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.52 0.70 0.48 1.01 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.52 0.69 0.39 0.96 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.52 0.69 0.31 0.91 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.53 0.68 0.22 0.86 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.53 0.68 0.14 0.81 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.54 0.67 0.06 0.76 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.54 0.67 -0.03 0.71 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.54 0.66 -0.11 0.66 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.55 0.66 -0.18 0.62 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.55 0.65 -0.26 0.57 
0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.51 0.70 0.57 1.06 
0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.56 0.64 0.36 0.91 
0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.56 0.64 0.28 0.87 
0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.55 0.65 0.21 0.83 
0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.55 0.66 0.13 0.79 
0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.3 -0.6 ■0.6 0.54 0.66 0.05 0.75 
0.4 -0.6 0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.53 0.67 -0.03 0.71 
0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.53 0.68 -0.12 0.67 
0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.52 0.69 -0.20 0.62 
0.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.52 0.69 -0.29 0.58 
0.4 -0.6 1.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.51 0.70 -0.38 0.53 
0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.54 0.62 0.55 1.01 
0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.53 0.63 0.47 0.97 
0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.52 0.63 0.39 0.93 
0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.52 0.64 0.31 0.88 
0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.51 0.65 0.23 0.84 
0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.51 0.66 0.15 0.80 
0.4 -0.6 0.6 ■0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.50 0.66 0.06 0.76 
0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.49 0.67 -0.03 0.71 
0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.49 0.68 -0.12 0.66 
0.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.48 0.69 -0.21 0.62 
0.4 •0.6 1.0 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.48 0.70 -0.30 0.57 
0.5 -0.6 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.51 0.70 0.57 1.06 
0.5 -0.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.57 0.59 0.35 0.88 
0.5 -0.6 0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.55 0.60 0.28 0.85 
0.5 -0.6 0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.54 0.62 0.21 0.82 
0.5 -0.6 0.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.52 0.64 0.13 0.78 
0.5 -0.6 0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.51 0.66 0.05 0.75 
0.5 -0.6 0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.49 0.68 -0.03 0.71 
0.5 -0.6 0.7 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.48 0.70 -0.13 0.67 
0.5 -0.6 0.8 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.72 -0.23 0.63 
0.5 -0.6 0.9 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.75 -0.33 0.58 



















E,; 1 *»  1 E» 1    E„ 1    En E» D Vi"   1 Vj"     1 
1.15 0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.68 0.82 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 067 0.72 1.09 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.66 0.62 1.03 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.66 0.52 0.97 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.65 0.42 0.91 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.65 0.33 0.86 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.64 0.24 0.80 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 •0.6 0.46 0.64 0.15 0.75 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.63 0.06 0.69 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.63 -0.03 0.64 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.62 -0.12 0.59 
0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.68 0.82 1.15 
0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.49 0.58 0.55 0.94 
0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.49 0.59 0.47 0.90 
0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.48 0.59 0.39 0.86 
0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.48 0.60 0.31 0.82 
0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.61 0.23 0.77 
0.4 -0.6 0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.62 0.14 0.73 
0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 046 062 0.05 0.69 
0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.63 -0.04 0.64 
0.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 045 0.64 -0.13 0.59 
0.4 -0.6 1.0 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.65 -0.22 0.54 
0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.56 0.76 1.05 
0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.57 0.68 1.01 
0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -06 0.46 0.58 0.60 0.97 
0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.58 0.51 0.92 
0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.59 0.43 0.88 
0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.60 0.34 0.83 
0.4 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.61 0.25 0.79 
0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.62 0.16 0.74 
0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.62 0.06 0.69 
0.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.63 -0.04 0.64 
0.4 -0.6 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.64 -0.14 0.59 
0.5 -0.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.68 0.82 1.15 
0.5 -0.6 0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.51 051 0.53 0.89 
0.5 -0.6 0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.50 0.52 0.46 0.86 
0.5 -0.6 0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.48 0.54 0.39 0.83 
0.5 -0.6 0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.56 0.32 0.80 
0.5 -0.6 0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.57 0.24 0.76 
0.5 -0.6 0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.59 0.15 0.72 
0.5 -0.6 0.7 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.62 0.06 0.68 
0.5 -0.6 0.8 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.64 -0.04 064 
0.5 -0.6 0.9 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.66 -0.15 0.59 




i A B, P, Q a, b> Yi GNP DE 
1   (U.S.) 0.4 0.0104 1.0 10.0 0.97 003 0.64 530*00 337800 
2 (Japan) 0.4 0.01 1.0 6.1 0.98 0.02 0.0« 3217000 31390 
3(USSR) 0.4 0.0235 1.0 5.2 0.94 0.06 0.68 2771000 362700 
Eu 1   *»    1 E,, 1    E,, |    *, E,, D ~^T ~        | Y,' 
0.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.81 0.88 1.25 
0.2 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.79 0.75 1.16 
0.2 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.76 0.63 1.08 
0.2 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.74 0.52 1.00 
0.2 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.72 0.41 0.93 
0.2 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.70 0.31 0.86 
0.2 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.48 0.68 0.22 080 
0.2 -0.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.49 066 0.13 0.74 
0.2 -0.6 0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.51 0.64 0.04 0.68 
0.2 -0.6 0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.52 0.63 -0.04 0.62 
0.2 -0.6 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.53 0.61 -0.11 0.57 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.81 0.88 1.25 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 -06 -0.6 0.44 0.67 0.71 1.08 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.67 0.61 1.02 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.66 0.51 0.96 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 -06 -0.6 0.45 0.66 0.42 0.90 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 -06 -0.6 0.45 0.65 0.32 0.84 
0.3 -0.6 06 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.65 0.23 0.79 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.64 0.14 0.73 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.64 0.05 0.68 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.63 -0.04 0.62 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.63 -0.13 0.57 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.69 1.00 1.25 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.68 0.89 1.18 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.68 0.78 1.11 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.67 0.67 1.05 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.67 0.56 0.98 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.66 0.46 0.92 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.65 0.35 0.86 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -06 0.42 0.65 0.25 0.80 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.64 0.15 0.74 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.64 0.06 0.68 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.63 -0.04 0.62 
0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.81 0.88 1.25 
0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.56 0.83 1.08 
0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.57 0.74 1.03 
0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.58 0.65 0.99 
0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.58 0.56 0.94 
0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.59 0.47 0.89 
0.4 -0.6 0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.60 0.37 0.84 
0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.61 0.27 0.79 
0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.62 0.17 0.74 
0.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.38 0.63 0.06 0.68 




i A B, P, a a. h Yi ONP DE 
1   (U.S.) 0.4 0.0114 1.0 10.0 0.97 0.03 0.66 5450000 357900 
2 (Japan) 0.4 0.01 1.0 6.1 0.98 0.02 0.06 3303000 32880 
3 (USSR) 0.4 0.0225 1.0 5.3 0.95 0.05 0.67 2867000 366400 
E,, 1   *»    1 E,, 1    E» |    E,, E„ D Y-'   1 *•'     1 Y," 
0.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.36 0.89 1.12 1.42 
0.2 -0.6 0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.37 0.86 0.96 1.31 
0.2 -0.6 0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.38 0.83 0.81 1.21 
0.2 -0.6 0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.80 0.68 1.12 
0.2 -0.6 0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.77 0.55 1.03 
0.2 -0.6 0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.75 0.43 0.95 
0.2 -0.6 0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.72 0.32 0.87 
0.2 -0.6 0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.70 0.22 0.80 
•   0.2 -0.6 0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.68 0.12 0.73 
0.2 -0.6 0.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.48 0.66 0.02 0.67 
0.2 -0.6 1.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.49 0.65 -0.07 0.61 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.36 0.89 1.12 1.42 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.70 0.71 1.08 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.70 0.61 1.02 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.69 0.51 0.96 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.68 0.41 0.90 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.68 0.31 0.84 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.67 0.21 0.78 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.67 0.12 0.73 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.66 0.02 0.67 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.65 -0.07 0.61 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.65 -0.16 0.56 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.72 1.01 1.26 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.71 0.89 1.19 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.70 0.78 1.12 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.70 0.66 1.05 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 069 0.55 0.99 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.69 0.44 0.92 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 068 0.34 0.86 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.67 0.23 0.79 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.67 0.13 0.73 
03 -0.6 0.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.66 0.03 0.67 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.65 -0.07 0.61 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.36 0.89 1.12 1.42 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.36 0.72 1.11 1.32 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.36 0.72 0.98 1.24 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.37 0.71 0.85 1.17 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.37 0.70 0.73 1.09 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.37 0.69 0.60 1.02 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.38 0.69 0.48 0.95 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.38 0.68 0.37 0.87 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.67 0.25 0.81 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.67 0.14 0.74 





















Eii 1   *'    1 E,i 1    Eo E,, E» D "*T -•    | Y3" 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.67 0.81 1.12 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 ■0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.67 0.71 1.06 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.66 0.61 1.00 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.65 0.51 0.95 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.65 0.42 0.89 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.64 0.32 0.83 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.64 0.23 078 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.63 0.14 0.72 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.63 0.05 0.67 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.6 -06 -0.6 0.47 0.62 -0.04 0.62 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.62 -0.12 0.57 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.67 0.81 1.12 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.68 0.88 1.17 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.67 077 1.10 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.66 0.66 1.04 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.66 0.56 0.97 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.65 0.45 0.91 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.65 0.35 0.85 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 064 025 0.79 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.63 0.15 0.73 
03 -0.6 0.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.63 0.06 0.67 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.62 -0.04 0.62 
0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.56 0.75 1.03 
0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.57 0.67 0.99 
0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.57 0.59 0.94 
0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.58 0.51 0.90 
0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.59 0.42 0.86 
0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.60 0.33 0.81 
0.4 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.60 0.24 0.76 
0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.61 0.15 0.72 
0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.62 0.06 0.67 
0.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.63 -0.04 0.62 
0.4 -0.6 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.64 -0.14 0.57 
0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.67 0.81 1.12 
0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.55 0.82 1.06 
0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.56 0.74 1.02 
0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.57 0.65 0.97 
0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.58 0.56 0.93 
0.4 
-0.6 0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.58 0.47 0.88 
0.4 -0.6 0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.59 0.37 0.83 
0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.60 0.27 0.78 
0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.39 0.61 0.17 0.73 
0.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.38 0.62 0.07 0.67 




i A, B, P, Q a, b, Y, GNP DE 
1   (U.S.) 0.4 0.01 1.0 10.0 0.98 0.02 0.60 5837000 348500 
2 (Japan) 0.4 0.01 1.0 6.3 0.98 0.02 0.06 3661000 36250 
3 (USSR) 0.4 0.0222 1.0 5.1 0.95 0.05 0.65 2982000 379300 
E,, 1   E»    1 E» |    E„ |    *. !   E» D -      1 Y'       1 Y," 
0.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.78 0.85 1.19 
0.2 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.75 0.73 1.11 
0.2 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.73 0.62 1.03 
0.2 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.71 0.51 0.96 
0.2 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.68 0.41 0.89 
0.2 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 ■0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.67 0.31 0.82 
0.2 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.48 0.65 0.22 0.76 
0.2 -0.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.49 0.63 0.13 0.70 
0.2 -0.6 0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.51 0.61 0.05 0.65 
0.2 -0.6 0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.52 0.60 -0.02 0.59 
0.2 -0.6 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.53 0.58 -0.10 0.55 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.78 0.85 1.19 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.48 0.63 0.55 0.94 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.48 0.63 0.46 0.89 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.48 0.62 0.38 0.84 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.49 0.62 0.30 0.79 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.49 0.61 0.21 0.74 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.49 0.61 0.13 0.69 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.50 0.60 0.05 0.64 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.50 0.60 -0.02 0.60 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.51 0.60 -0.10 0.55 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.51 0.59 -0.18 0.50 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.65 0.79 1.09 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.64 0.69 1.03 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.64 0.60 0.97 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.63 0.50 0.91 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.63 0.41 0.86 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.62 0.32 0.80 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.62 0.23 0.75 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.61 0.14 0.70 
03 -0.6 0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.60 0.06 0.65 
0.3 •0.6 0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.60 -0.03 0.60 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.47 0.59 -0.11 0.55 
0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.40 0.78 0.85 1.19 
0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.46 0.54 0.66 0.95 
0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.55 0.58 0.91 
0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.45 0.56 0.50 0.87 
0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.57 0.42 0.83 
0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.44 0.57 0.33 0.78 
0.4 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.58 0.25 0.74 
0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.43 0.59 0.16 0.69 
0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.42 0.60 0.07 0.64 
0.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.60 -0.03 0.60 
0.4 -0.6 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.41 0.61 -0.12 0.55 
54 
i A B, P, Q a. h Yi ONP DE 
1  (U.S.) 0.4 0.0104 1.0 10.0 0.97 0.03 0.58 5993003 346000 
2 (Japan) 0.4 0.01 1.0 6.4 0.98 0.02 0.06 3838000 37700 
3 (USSR) 0.4 0.0185 1.0 5.0 0.96 0.04 0.58 3010000 344800 
E,, 1   E»   1 E,, 1    E,, 1    E,i E» D *'l *'     1 Y," 
0.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.62 0.23 0.71 
0.2 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.63 0.61 0.16 0.66 
0.2 -0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.65 0.60 0.10 0.62 
0.2 -0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.66 0.59 0.04 0.58 
0.2 -0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.67 0.57 -0.01 0.54 
0.2 -0.6 0.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.69 0.56 -0.07 0.50 
0.2 ■0.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.70 0.55 -0.12 0.47 
0.2 -0.6 0.7 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.72 0.54 -0.17 0.43 
0.2 -0.6 0.8 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.73 0.53 -0.22 0.40 
0.2 -0.6 0.9 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.74 0.52 -0.26 0.37 
0.2 -0.6 1.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.76 0.51 -0.31 0.34 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.62 0.23 0.71 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.63 0.59 0.16 0.65 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.63 0.58 0.10 0.62 
0.3 •0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.64 0.58 0.04 0.58 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.64 0.58 -0.02 0.54 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.65 0.57 -0.07 0.51 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.65 0.57 -0.13 0.47 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.65 0.56 -0.19 0.44 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.66 0.56 -0.24 0.40 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.66 0.56 -0.30 0.37 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.67 0.55 -0.35 0.34 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.59 0.60 0.30 0.74 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.59 0.59 0.23 0.70 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.59 0.59 0.17 0.66 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.60 0.58 0.11 0.62 
03 •0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.60 0.58 0.04 0.58 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.61 0.58 -0.02 0.54 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.61 0.57 -0.08 0.50 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.61 0.57 -0.14 0.47 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.56 -0.20 0.43 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.56 -0.26 0.39 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.63 0.56 •0.32 0.36 
0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.62 0.23 0.71 
0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.59 0.56 0.23 0.68 
0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.59 0.56 0.17 0.64 
0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.58 0.57 0.11 0.61 
0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.58 0.57 0.05 0.58 
0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.57 0.58 -0.02 0.54 
0.4 -0.6 0.6 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.56 0.58 -0.09 0.51 
0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.56 0.59 -0.15 0.47 
0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.55 0.59 -0.22 0.44 
0.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.55 0.60 -0.29 0.40 




i A B, Pi a a. h Yi GNP DE 
1  (U.S.) 0.4 0.0108 1.0 10.0 0.97 0.03 0.55 6071000 333900 
2 (Japan) 0.4 0.01 1.0 6.6 0.98 0.02 0.06 4021000 39130 
3 (USSR) 0.4 0.015 1.0 4.8 0.96 004 0.52 2901000 318400 
Eu 1 °» 1 E,! 1    E,, 1    En E« D V| *.'     1 Y," 
0.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.60 0.22 0.65 
0.2 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.63 0.58 0.16 0.61 
0.2 -0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.64 0.57 0.10 0.56 
0.2 -0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.66 0.56 0.05 0.52 
0.2 -0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.67 0.55 0.00 0.49 
0.2 -0.6 OS -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.69 0.54 -0.06 0.45 
0.2 -0.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.70 OS -0.11 0.42 
02 -0.6 0.7 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.71 0.52 -0.15 0.38 
0.2 -0.6 0.8 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.73 0.51 -0.20 0.35 
0.2 -0.6 0.9 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.74 0.50 -0.24 0.32 
0.2 -0.6 1.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.76 0.49 -0.29 0.29 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.60 0.22 0.65 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.63 0.56 0.16 0.59 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.63 0.56 0.11 0.56 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.64 0.55 0.05 0.52 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.64 0.55 -0.01 0.49 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.64 0.55 -0.06 0.45 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.65 0.54 -0.11 0.42 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.65 0.54 -0.17 0.39 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.66 0.53 -0.22 0.35 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.66 0.53 -0.27 0.32 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.67 0.53 -0.32 0.29 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.58 0.57 0.29 0.67 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.59 0.57 0.23 0.63 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.59 0.56 0.17 0.59 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.60 0.56 0.11 0.56 
0J -0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.60 0.55 0.05 0.52 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.60 0.55 -0.01 0.48 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.61 0.54 -0.07 0.45 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.61 0.54 -0.13 0.41 
0.3 •0.6 0.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.54 -0.18 0.38 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.53 -0.24 0.34 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.63 0.53 -0.29 0.31 
0.65 0.4 .   -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.60 0.22 
0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.59 0.53 0.23 0.61 
0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.58 0.54 0.17 0.58 
0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.58 0.54 0.11 0.55 
0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.57 0.55 0.05 0.52 
0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.57 0.55 -0.01 0.48 
0.4 -0.6 0.6 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.56 0.56 -0.08 0.45 
0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.2 ■0.6 -0.6 0.56 0.56 -0.14 042 
0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.55 0.57 -0.21 0.38 
0.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.55 0.57 -0.27 0.35 
0.4 -0.6 1.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.54 0.58 -0.34 0.31 
56 
1991 
1  (U.S.) 0.4 0.0102 1.0 0.49 6029000 
2 (Japan) 0.4 0.01 1.0 0.07 
3 (USSR) 0.0115 1.0 0.97 0.03 2659000 273103 
E,i 1   *»    1 E,i 1    E„ 1    En E» D Y,'   I Y,       | Y; 
0.2 •0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.57 0.55 0.29 0.61 
0.2 -0.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.58 0.54 0.23 057 
0.2 -0.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.60 0.52 0.17 0.53 
0.2 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.61 051 0.12 0.49 
0.2 -0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.50 0.06 0.45 
0.2 -0.6 0.5 -02 -0.6 -0.6 0.64 0.49 0.01 0.42 
0.2 -0.6 0.6 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.65 0.48 -0.04 0.38 
0.2 -0.6 0.7 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.67 0.47 -0.08 0.35 
0.2 -0.6 0.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.68 0.46 -0.13 0.32 
0.2 -0.6 0.9 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.70 0.45 -0.17 0.29 
0.2 -0.6 1.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 071 0.44 -0.21 0.26 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.57 0.55 0.29 0.61 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.50 0.17 0.51 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.63 0.50 0.12 0.48 
03 -0.6 0J ■0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.63 0.49 0.07 0.45 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.64 0.49 0.02 0.42 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.64 0.48 -0.03 0.39 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.65 0.48 -0.08 0.36 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.65 0.48 -0.12 0.33 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.66 0.47 -0.17 0.30 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.66 0.47 -0.22 0.27 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.67 0.47 -0.26 0.24 
0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.58 0.51 0.28 0.58 
0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.58 0.50 0.23 0.55 
0.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.59 0.50 0.17 0.52 
0.3 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.59 0.50 0.12 0.48 
0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.60 0.49 0.07 0.45 
0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.60 0.49 0.01 0.42 
0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.61 0.48 -0.04 0.38 
0.3 -0.6 0.7 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.61 0.48 -0.09 0.35 
0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.48 -0.14 0.32 
0.3 -0.6 0.9 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.47 -0.19 0.29 
0.3 -0.6 1.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.63 0.47 -0.24 0.26 
0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.57 0.55 0.29 0.61 
0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.62 0.47 0.17 0.50 
0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.61 0.48 0.12 0.47 
0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.61 0.48 0.07 0.45 
0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.61 0.49 0.02 0.42 
0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.60 0.49 -0.03 0.39 
0.4 -0.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.60 0.49 -0.08 0.36 
0.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.59 0.50 -0.14 0.33 
0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.59 0.50 -0.19 0.30 
0.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.58 0.51 -0.25 0.27 
0.4 -0.6 1.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 0.58 0.51 -O.30 0.24 
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10. 







3 (Russia) 0.4 1.0 1.4 870600 
E,3 1 *•> 1 E:i 1    E,, I    En E» D *•'   1 *>'     1 Y3" 
0.2 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.79 0.51 0.23 0.31 
0.2 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.78 0.51 0.17 0.29 
0.2 -0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.78 0.51 0.12 0.27 
0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 077 0.51 007 0.25 
0.2 -0.4 0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.77 0.52 0.01 0.23 
0.2 -0.4 0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.77 0.52 -0.05 0.20 
0.2 -0.4 0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.76 0.52 -0.10 0.18 
0.2 -0.4 0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.76 0.53 -0.16 0.16 
0.2 -0.4 0.8 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.76 0.53 -0.22 0.14 
0.2 -0.4 0.9 -0.2 ■0.4 -0.4 0.75 0.53 -0.27 0.12 
0.2 -0.4 1.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.75 0.53 -0.33 0.10 
0.3 -0.4 00 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.79 0.51 0.23 0.31 
0.3 -0.4 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.73 0.48 0.24 0.30 
0.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.71 0.49 0.18 0.28 
0.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.70 0.50 0.13 0.26 
03 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.69 0.51 0.07 0.24 
0.3 -0.4 05 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.67 0.52 0.00 0.22 
0.3 -0.4 0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.66 0.53 0.06 0.20 
0.3 -0.4 0.7 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.65 0.54 -0.13 0.18 
0.3 -0.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.63 0.55 -0.20 0.16 
0.3 -0.4 0.9 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.62 0.56 0.27 0.13 
0.3 -0.4 1.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.61 0.57 -0.35 on 
0.3 -0.4 oo -0.5 -0.4 0.4 0.71 0.47 0.33 0.33 
0.3 -0.4 0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.70 0.47 0.27 0.31 
0.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.68 0.48 0.22 0.29 
0.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.67 0.49 0.16 0.27 
0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.66 0.50 0.10 0.25 
0.3 -0.4 0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.65 0.51 0.03 0.23 
0.3 -0.4 0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.63 0.52 -0.04 0.21 
0.3 -0.4 07 •0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.62 0.53 -0.11 0.19 
0.3 -0.4 0.8 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.61 0.55 -0.18 0.16 
0.3 -0.4 0.9 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.59 0.56 -0.26 0.14 
0.3 -0.4 1.0 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.58 0.57 -0.34 Oil 
0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.79 0.51 0.23 0.31 
0.4 -0.4 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.73 0.45 0.24 0.29 
0.4 -0.4 0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.71 0.47 0.18 0.28 
0.4 -0.4 0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.69 0.48 ' 0.13 0.26 
0.4 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.66 0.50 0.07 0.24 
0.4 -0.4 0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.64 0.52 0.00 0.22 
0.4 -0.4 0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.62 0.54 -0.07 0.20 
0.4 -0.4 0.7 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.60 0.56 -0.14 0.18 
0.4 -0.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.57 0.58 -0.22 0.16 
0.4 -0.4 0.9 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 055 060 -0.31 0.13 




i A B, P. a a. h Yi GNP DE 
1  (U.S.) 0.4 0.0181 1.0 10.0 0.96 0.04 0.47 6348000 297600 
2 (Japan) 0.4 0.01 1.0 6.7 0.98 0.02 0.07 4260000 41730 
3 (Russia) 0.4 0.009 1.0 1.2 0.98 0.02 0.18 777400 113800 
E,, 1   *>   1 E,, 1    E,, 1    E,. E,, D *•' T *■     1 Yj" 
0.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.87 0.46 0.21 0.22 
0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.86 0.46 0.16 0.21 
0.2 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.85 0.47 0.11 0.20 
0.2 -0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.84 0.47 0.06 0.18 
0.2 -0.3 0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.83 0.48 0.01 0.17 
0.2 -0.3 0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.82 0.49 -0.04 0.16 
0.2 -0.3 0.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.81 0.49 -0.10 0.14 
0.2 -0.3 0.7 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.80 0.50 -0.15 0.13 
0.2 -0.3 0.8 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.79 0.51 -0.21 0.11 
0.2 -0.3 0.9 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.78 0.51 -0.27 0.10 
0.2 -0.3 1.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.76 0.52 -0.33 0.08 
0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.87 0.46 0.21 0.22 
0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.81 0.44 0.21 0.21 
0.3 -0.3 0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.79 0.45 0.16 0.20 
0.3 -0.3 0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.77 0.46 0.10 0.19 
0.3 -0.3 0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.76 0.47 0.05 0.18 
0.3 -0.3 0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.74 0.48 -0.01 0.17 
0.3 -0.3 0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.72 0.50 -0.07 0.15 
0.3 -0.3 0.7 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.70 0.51 ■0.13 0.14 
0.3 -0.3 0.8 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.68 0.53 -0.20 0.12 
0.3 -0.3 0.9 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.66 0.54 -0.27 0.11 
0.3 -0.3 1.0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.64 0.56 -0.35 0.09 
0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.81 0.42 0.28 0.23 
0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.79 0.43 023 0.22 
0.3 -0.3 0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.77 0.44 0.18 0.21 
0.3 -0.3 0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.75 0.45 0.13 0.20 
03 -0.3 0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.73 0.47 0.07 0.18 
0.3 -0.3 0.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.71 0.48 0.01 0.17 
0.3 -0.3 0.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.70 0.49 -O.05 0.16 
0.3 -0.3 0.7 -0.5 -0.3 •0.3 0.68 0.51 -0.11 0.14 
0.3 -0.3 0.8 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.66 0.52 -0.18 0.13 
0.3 -0.3 0.9 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.64 0.54 -0.25 0.11 
0.3 -0.3 1.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.62 0.55 43.33 0.09 
0.4 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 •   -0.3 -0.3 0.87 0.46 0.21 0.22 
0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.87 0.44 0.14 0.20 
0.4 -0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.84 0.45 0.09 0.19 
0.4 -0.3 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.81 0.47 0.04 0.18 
0.4 -0.3 0.4 -0.1 ■0.3 -0.3 0.78 0.48 -0.01 0.17 
0.4 -0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.75 0.50 -0.07 0.15 
0.4 -0.3 0.6 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.72 0.52 -0.13 0.14 
0.4 -0.3 0.7 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.69 0.55 -0.20 0.13 
0.4 -0.3 0.8 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.67 0.57 -0.27 0.11 
0.4 -0.3 0.9 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.64 0.59 -0.35 0.10 
0.4 -0.3 1.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.61 0.62 -0.44 0.08 
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APPENDIX C. RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANÄLYSIS(Ä) 
Regression analysis (A) as well as regression analysis (B) was conducted using 
various values for Y( and P;. In the following tables of outputs, the values used in runs are 
expressed in this table   : 
Yi Multiplier 0.15 Pi 1.00 
Y2 Multiplier 1.00 P2 2.00 
Y3 Multiplier 0.15 P3 0.50 
This example means that Yt and Y3 decreased by 50 percent and P2 and P3 became 2.0 and 
0.5. Although these values change from the original data (Table 6) to the multiplied data 
which are provided by the next table, the multiplied data in each run are omitted in this 
Appendix and Appendix E for regression analysis (B). 
Year CVPi G2/P2 G3/P3 Y, Y2 Y3 
1983 10.00 12.2191 2.7956 0.0964 0.0596 0.1091 
1984 10.00 12.1896 2.7345 0.0961 0.0595 0.1069 
1985 10.00 12.0399 2.6366 0.0959 0.0591 0.1025 
1986 10.00 12.1775 2.6084 0.0964 0.0604 0.1011 
1987 10.00 12.3153 2.5892 0.0944 0.0614 0.0994 
1988 10.00 12.5444 2.5495 0.0904 0.0622 0.0946 
1989 10.00 12.8663 2.4850 0.0862 0.0632 0.0875 
1990 10.00 13.3214 2.3686 0.0808 0.0648 0.0776 
1991 10.00 13.6538 1.7671 0.0772 0.0662 0.0607 
1992 10.00 13.7121 1.1748 0.0732 0.0667 0.0434 
1993 10.00 13.6135 0.6597 0.0731 0.0664 0.0312 
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1. 
Y, Multiplier 1.00 Pi 1.00 
Y2 Multiplier 1.00 P2 1.00 
Y, Multiplier 1.00 Ps 1.00 
(7.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.86S 
Standard Error 0.006 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.041 0.014 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 3E-04 4E-0S 
Total 11 0.041 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b, 0.1536 0.008 18.66 7E-08 0.135 0.173 
-0.1558 0.011 -13.82 7E-07 -0.182 -0.130 
b3a]Eo 0.0094 0.003 3.532 8E-03 0.003 0.016 
H.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.848 
Standard Error SE-04 
df SS MS F Sianificance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-05 119 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
biaiEn 0.0009 0.001 1.455 0.184 -0.001 0.002 
b2 0.0084 0.001 9.804 IE-OS 0.006 0.010 
bia?En -0.0001 2E-04 -0.395 0.703 -0.001 4E-04 
n.o 
Multiple R 0.998 
R Square 0.996 
Adjusted R Square 0.871 
Standard Error 0.012 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.318 0.106 748 4E-09 
Residual 8 0.001 1E-04 
Total 11 0.319 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
bi*Bi 0.1416 0.015 9.262 2E-05 0.106 0.177 
b2a,E)2 -0.1938 0.021 -9.254 2E-05 -0.242 -0.146 
b, 0.0850 0.005 17.15 1E-07 0.074 0.096 
b, 0.1536 b2a,E12 0.1558 Eu 21.8413 
at 0.8464 bsaiEu -0.0094 ED -0.1310 
b2 0.0084 bia2Bi -0.0009 s, -0.0060 
a, 0.9916 b,a,E, 0.0001 Es       ,. 0.0010 
b, 0.0850 bia,E), -0.1416 En -1.0076 
b, 0.9150 b2a,Ej2 0.1938 E,2 25.1270 
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2. 
Y, Multiplier 0.20 Pi 1.00 
Yz Multiplier 1.00 R> 1.00 
Yj Multiplier 0.20 P) 1.00 
(7.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.86S 
Standard Error 0.001 
df ss MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.002 0.001 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 IE-OS 2E-06 
Total 11 0.002 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Uncer 95% 
b, 0.0307 0.002 18.66 7E-08 0.027 0.035 
b,a,E, -0.0312 0.002 -13.82 7E-07 -0.036 -0.026 
b,aiEi3 0.0019 0.001 3.532 0.008 0.001 0.003 
(7.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.848 
Standard Error 5E-04 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-0S 119 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P~ value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
biaaBi 0.0009 0.001 1.455 0.184 -0.001 0.002 
b2 0.0084 0.001 9.804 1E-05 0.006 0.010 
bsazEn -0.0001 2E-04 -0.395 0.703 -0.001 4E-04 
<Z£1 
Multiple R 0.998 
R Square 0.996 
Adjusted R Square 0.871 
Standard Error 0.002 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.013 0.004 748 4E-09 
Residual 8 5E-05 6E-06 
Total 11 0.013 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b,a,B, 0.0283 0.003 9.262 2E-05 0.021 0.035 
b2ajE)2 -0.0388 0.004 -9.254 2E-0S -0.048 -0.029 
b, 0.0170 0.001 17.15 1E-07 0.015 0.019 
b, 0.0307 b2a,Ei2 0.0312 Si 3.8143 
ai 0.9693 bsaiEu -0.0019 BJ -0.1144 
b2 0.0084 biajEii -0.0009 BJ, -0.0300 
a, 0.9916 b,a,Bi 0.0001 B, 0.0048 
b, 0.0170 b,a,Bi -0.0283 Si -0.9379 
b, 0.9830 b2a,Ej2 0.0388 B2 4.6777 
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3. 
Yi Multiplier 0.15 Pi 1.00 
Y> Multiplier 1.00 P2 1.00 
Yj Multiplier 0.15 P, 1.00 
(7.A1 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.855 
StandardError 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.001 3BOt 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 7E-06 9E-OT 
Total 11 0.001 
Coefficients StandardError t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b, 0.0230 0.001 18.66 7E<8 0.020 0.026 
-0.0234 0.002 -13.82 7&07 -0.027 -0.019 
b,a, E, 0.0014 4BW 3.532 0.008 5E-04 0.002 
(7.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.848 
StandardError 5BW 
df SS MS F SienificanceF 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E05 119 2E-0S 
Residual 8 2E-06 2BOT 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients StandardError t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
DABI 0.0009 0.001 1.455 0.184 -0.001 
0.002 
b2 0.0084 0.001 9.804 1B05 0.006 
0.010 
bjajBj -8&05 2BW -0.395 0.703 -0.001 4E04 
(7.Q 
Multiple R 0.998 
RSauare 0.996 
Adjusted R Square 0871 
StandardError 0.002 
df SS MS F Significance F 
3 0.007 0.002 748 4E4» 
Residual 8 3&05 3E-06 
Total 11 O.0O7 
Coefficients StandardError tStat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0.0212 0.002 9.262 2E-05 0.016 0.027 
b2ajB2 -0.0291 0.003 -9.254 2E-05 -0.036 -0022 
b, 0.0128 0.001 17.15 1E-07 0.011 
0.014 
bi 0.0230 b2aiEiz 0.0234 E2 2.8382 
3l 0.9770 b,a,B3 -0.0014 Si -0.1135 
b2 0.0084 bi%Bi -0.0009 s. -0.O400 
% 0.9916 b3a2E2) 0.0001 s, 0.0064 
b, 0.0128 bia,E,i -0.0212 B, -0.9338 
b, 0.9872 b2a3B2 0.0291 B2 3.4932 
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Y! Multiplier 0.10 P. 1.00 
Y2 Multiplier 1.00 P2 1.00 
Y3 Multiplier 0.10 Py 1.00 
(7.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 4E-04 1E-04 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 3E-06 4E-07 
Total 11 4E-04 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
bt 0.0154 0.001 18.66 7E-08 0.013 0.017 
b2a,EE -0.0156 0.001 -13.82 7E-07 -0.018 -0.013 
bj^Eu 0.0009 3E-04 3.532 0.008 3E-04 0.002 
(7.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.848 
Standard Error 5E-04 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-05 119 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b,a2Eii 0.0009 0.001 1.455 0.184 -0.001 0.002 
b2 0.0084 0.001 9.804 1E-05 0.006 0.010 
b^Ea -0.0001 2E-04 -0.395 0.703 -0.001 4E-04 
(7.C) 
Multiple R 0.998 
R Square 0.996 
Adjusted R Square 0.871 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.003 0.001 748 4E-09 
Residual 8 1E-05 1E-06 
Total 11 0.003 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
biajEji 0.0142 0.002 9.262 2E-05 0.011 0.018 
b2^Ej2 -0.0194 0.002 -9.254 2E-0S -0.024 -0.015 
b, 0.0085 5E-04 17.15 1E-07 0.007 0.010 
b, 0.0154 b2aiEi2 0.0156 Eu 1.8774 
ai 0.9846 b3aiEu -0.0009 ED -0.1126 
b2 0.0084 b^Ea -0.0009 En -0.0600 
a> 0.9916 bia,Bi 0.0001 B, 0.0095 
b, 0.0085 biajE,, -0.0142 Bi -0.9298 
b, 0.9915 b2ajEj2 0.0194 E;2 2.3188 
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Y[ Multiplier 0.15 P, 1.00 
Y2 Multiplier 1.00 ft 1.50 
Y, Multiplier 0.15 P3 0.75 
(7.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.001 
df ss MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.001 3E-04 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 7E-06 9E-07 
Total 11 0.001 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
bi 0.0230 0.001 18.66 7E-08 0.020 0.026 
b2aiEi2 -0.0156 0.001 -13.82 7E-07 -0.018 -0.013 
b3aiEi3 0.0019 0.001 3.532 0.008 0.001 0.003 
(7.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.848 
Standard Error SE-04 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-0S 119 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
01%%! 0.0009 0.001 1.455 0.184 -0.001 0.002 
02 0.0056 0.001 9.804 IE-OS 0.004 0.007 
biajEa -0.0001 3E-04 -0.395 0.703 -0.001 0.001 
(7.C) 
Multiple R 0.998 
R Square 0.996 
Adjusted R Square 0.871 
Standard Error 0.002 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.007 0.002 748 4E-09 
8 3E-05 3E-06 
Total 11 0.007 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
biasEji 0.0212 0.002 9.262 2E-05 0.016 0.027 
b2ajE,2 -0.0194 0.002 -9.254 2E-05 -0.024 -0.015 
b, 0.0170 0.001 17.15 1E-07 0.015 0.019 
b, 0.0230 b2aiE,2 0.0156 Eo 2.8382 
ai 0.9770 b,aiEu -0.0019 Eu -0.1135 
b2 0.0056 b,a2E2i -0.0009 S, -0.0399 
a2 0.9944 b)a2Ea 0.0001 Ea 0.0063 
b, 0.0170 biajEj! -0.0212 E„ -0.9379 
b3 0.9830 b2ajB2 0.0194 E>2 3.5083 
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Yi Multiplier 0.15 P, 1.00 
Y2 Multiplier 1.00 Pa 2.00 
Y, Multiplier 0.1S P5 0.50 
(7.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.001 3E-04 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 7E-06 9E-07 
Total 11 0.001 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b, 0.0230 0.001 18.66 7E-08 0.020 0.026 
M,^ -0.0117 0.001 -13.82 7E-07 -0.014 -0.010 
b^Eu 0.0028 0.001 3.532 0.008 0.001 0.005 
(7.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.848 
Standard Error 5E-04 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-0S 119 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
bi%Bi 0.0009 0.001 1.455 0.184 -0.001 0.002 
bj 0.0042 4E-04 9.804 IE-OS 0.003 0.005 
b^Bj -0.0002 4E-04 -0.395 0.703 -0.001 0.001 
(7.C) 
Multiple R 0.998 
R Square 0.996 
Adjusted R Square 0.871 
Standard Error 0.002 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.007 0.002 748 4E-09 
Residual 8 3E-05 3E-06 
Total 11 0.007 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
biajEu 0.0212 0.002 9.262 2E-05 0.016 0.027 
b2ajE)2 -0.0145 0.002 -9.254 2E-05 -0.018 -0.011 
b, 0.0255 0.001 17.1S 1E-07 0.022 0.029 
bi 0.0230 bjaiEu 0.0117 Eu 2.8382 
ai 0.9770 biaiEu -0.0028 Eu -0.1135 
b2 0.0042 b^Bi -0.0009 B> -0.0398 
a, 0.9958 b,»Bi 0.0002 B, 0.0063 
b, 0.0255 b,a,E), -0.0212 Bi -0.9460 
b, 0.9745 b2ajEj2 0.0145 $2 3.5389 
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Y Multiplier 0.15 P, 1.00 
Y, Multiplier 1.00 P, 0.50 
M Multiplier 0.15 P, 2.00 
(7.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.001 3E-0* 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 7E-06 9E-07 
Total 11 0.001 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b, 0.0230 0.001 18.66 7E-08 0.020 0.026 
ME,, •0.0468 0.003 -13.82 7E-07 •0.055 •0.039 
ME,, 0.0007 2E-04 3.532 0.008 2E-04 0.001 
(7.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.848 
Standard Error 5E-04 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E05 119 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
ME,, 0.0009 0.001 1.455 0.184 -0.001 0.002 
b. 0.0169 0.002 9.804 1E-05 0.013 0.021 
ME,, -4E-05 1E-04 •0.395 0.703 -3E-04 2E04 
(7-C) 
Multiple R 0.998 
R Square 0.996 
Adjusted R Square 0.871 
Standard Error 0.002 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.007 0.002 748 4E09 
Residual 8 3E-05 3E-06 
Total 11 0.007 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b, aE,, 0.0212 0.002 9.262 2E-05 0.016 0.027 
ME,i -0.0581 0.006 -9.254 2E-05 -0.073 -0.044 
bi 0.0064 4E-04 17.15 IE-07 0.006 0.007 
b, 0.0230 b,a,E„ 0.0468 E* 2.8382 
a. 0.9770 b,a B, -0.0007 E, -0.1135 
b, 0.0169 bi^fi, -0.0009 Ei -0.0403 
32 0.9831 biaBi 0.0000 E, 0.0064 
b, 0.0064 b,s*5. -0.0212 5, -0.9278 
b, 0.9936 bi^Ej 0.0581 EU 3.4708 
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APPENDIX D. CALCULATION OF A LEADER - 
FOLLOWER FRAMEWORK 
1. FOLLOWERS 
Two reaction functions for Followers are provided by the equations (8.A) and 
(8.B). 
Yi = (bz)(—) - {aiE2i)Yx-{aiE73)Y3 
Y3 = (bA—\ -(a3E3i)Yi-{a3E32)Yz 
Substituting (8.B) into (8. A), a function of Y2 in terms of Y1 is obtained as (9.A) : 
Yi = (bi)(—) - {aiEn)Yx- (azEzs) (fe)(—) - {asE^Yi - {a3Bz)Yz 
= bi aiEziYi - azEz3b3— + azEi3ü3E3\Y\ + azEz3a3E3zYi 
Pi Pa 
Yz - aiEz3a3E3iY2 = bz azEziYi + azEz3ü3E3iYi - azEz3b3— 
Pz Pi 
C CT3 (l- azEi3a.3E3z)Yz = bz— + [azEzsmEn - azEz\)Y\- azEz3b3— 
(bz) (azEzi - aza3Ez3E3\)Yi - (biazEzs)— 
Yt — r— ~ 
1 - dZ(l3Ez3E3Z 
Substituting (9.A) into (8.B), a function of Y3 in terms of Y1 becomes (9.B). 
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y3 = (fe)[—] -(a3£31)Fi 
' £>2 — + (aiaiEviEzi - aiEi\)Yi - aibiEn— 
.(a3£s2)|_^__  ^ I 
ri aibiEiz- 
1 - aiazEv>E7>2 
I        aia-ibsEiiE-si \ G3 
Y3 = \bs +  — 
V       1- aiasE-nEsil r3 
\,        .aiOiEzsEsi-azEu       _ l¥r    /     asbiEn     \Gi 
L l-a2a3£23£32 J        \1- aiaiExEsz) Pi 
c Ct (bi) (aiEii- aia$EiiEn)Yi- (biasEii)— 
y3 El _- £- 
1 - dZOiEzzEsz 
2.   A LEADER 
To get a Leader's model, the utility function for Yl is maximized. 
Maximizing : Ui = Xi   Zi ' 
subject to Gi-Xi-PiFi = 0 
where Zi = Yi + En Yz + E13Y3 
The Lagrangean-function for this maximizing becomes : 
L = XiA> (Yi + EiiYi + EisYsf + A(Gi - X - P1Y1) 
By differentiation with respect to X1,Y1 and X, three equations are prepared 
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® Lx. = ZiaA(Xi)A"1-A = 0 
1
   '     \dYil 
® Lx=Gi-Xl-PiYi = 0 
Dividing ® by ®, results in : 








 is transformed by ©. 
Gi- Xi     Gi       AiZi y. 
A A     JdZ* 
\dYi) 
Gi        AiJYi + EnYz+EisYi) 
Pi    „/,     ^   dYi    „   dYs\ ri
    Sil + £i2 + Ei3  
\ dYi dYxl 
where  Z\ = Y\ + En Yi + E13Y3. 
Because functions of Y2 and Y3 as (9.A) and (9.B) have been derived, the following may 
be calculated : 
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dYi     -aiEii + aiosE-nEzx 
dY\ 1- aiazE-nE-iz 
© dYi     -C13E31+ aiOi EiiEn 
dYi l-aimExsEn 
Substitute (9.A), (9.B), © and © into ®, 
f r       c 
(pi) (azEii + aia3Ei3E3i)Yi - {aib3E?3) 






(fe)— - (a3£3i + aia,3Ei\E3-i)Y\ - {a3biE3T)— '     I 
+E,I        ft >i I      1 
'     ] 
1- aia3Ei2,E3i 
Bx 
„ I -aiEn + aia3Ei3E3i\     ^    -ü3E3i + a2C13E21 E32\ 
1 - £12   - £13  
V 1 - ai(l3Ez5E31        I \        1 - a2ü3El3E32        I 





En{aiE2i - aittiE23E3\) + Ei?(a3E3i - aia3EiiE32) 
1 - a2(l3E23E32 
E\2(aiEi\ - a.2a3E23E3i) + Ei3(asE3i - a2aiE2\E32) 
1 - aia3Ez3E3i 
biEn - a,3b2E\3E3i)— + UnExi - azfeEnfe) — ' 
I 'P2       V IPs  I 





Ei2{a.2Eii - aia3E23E3i) + En{a3E3i - a2a3£,2iEW 
1 - d2Cl3E23E32 
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r r^ c* ~\ 
Ai [biEii - aibiEuEii) — + (fc£i3 - aibiEnEiz) — ■JBi + Ai\ = & __|J  Pi     PBJ 
*l    ßi    /      Pi {X-aiasExsEn-aiEnEu + aiaiEnErsEsix 
-(13E13E31 + aiOhExbEuEsi ) 
Finally, I obtain the equation (11) as : 
Y - (fci)- - 
Pi 
(AifoZfo - AiasbiEisEsz)— + (Aifcisi3- Aiaib3EnEn)—\ 
/, \_[ A "3J 
^   '        
J
 B\ - B\aiOiEizE3i - BxdiEnEn + BiaiaiEnEnE-its. 
-BM3E13E31+ Bia2d3Ei3EziE32 I 
where  = b\ 
A1 + B1 
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APPENDIX E. RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS(B) 
Yi Multiplier 1.00 Pi 1.00 
Y, Multiplier 1.00 P. 1.00 
Y, Multiplier 1.00 P, 1.00 
(12.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.006 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.041 0.014 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 3E-04 4E-05 
Total 11 0.041 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
bi 0.15364 0.008 18.7 7E-08 0.135 0.173 
b,a.Eu -0.15584 0.011 -13.8 7E-07 -0.182 -0.130 
b> aEn 0.00943 0.003 3.532 0.008 0.003 0.016 
(12.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.847 
Standard Error 5E-04 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-05 117 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
hi 0.0094 2E-04 40.62 1E-10 0.009 0.010 
ME,, -0.0001 2E-04 -0.510 0.624 -0.001 4E-04 
at&t 0.0057 0.004 1.389 0.202 -0.004 0.015 
(12.C) 
Multiple R 0.999 
R Square 0.998 
Adjusted R Square 0.873 
Standard Error 0.008 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.318 0.106 1498 3E-10 
Residual 8 0.001 7E-05 
Total 11 0.319 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
be aEn -0.0507 0.004 -12.9 1E-06 -0.060 -0.042 
b, 0.0758 0.004 18.6 7E-08 0.066 0.085 
ajBi 0.9325 0.070 13.4 9E-07 0.772 1.093 
b, 0.1536 b,aE, 0.1558 E12 19.6471 
3| 0.8464 b,a,E,, -0.0094 E13 -0.1470 
b, 0.0094 "i5i -0.0057 E21 -0.0057 
3i 0.9906 b,a.E., 0.0001 E23 0.0016 
b, 0.0758 a>5i -0.9325 E31 -1.0089 
a> 0.9242 b2a,E,i 0.0507 E32 5.8557 
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Yi Multiplier 0.20 Pi 1.00 
Y; Multiplier 1.00 P, 1.00 
Y, Multiplier 0.20 P, 1.00 
Ü2.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Sauare 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.002 0.001 330 7E-06 
Residual 8 1E-05 2E-06 
Total 11 0.002 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% UDDer 95% 
bi 0.0307 0.002 18.66 7E-08 0.027 0.035 
ME,; -0.0312 0.002 ■ 13.82 7E-07 -0.036 -0.026 
bi aEu 0.0019 0.001 3.532 0.008 0.001 0.003 
(12.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.847 
Standard Error 5E-04 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-05 117 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
te 0.0094 2E-04 40.62 IE-10 0.009 0.010 
bi^Ej, -0.0001 2E-04 -0.510 0.624 -0.001 4E-04 
a2Bi 0.0283 0.020 1.389 0.202 -0.019 0.075 
(12.C) 
Multiple R 0.999 
R Square 0.998 
Adjusted R Square 0.873 
Standard Error 0.002 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.013 0.004 1498 3E-10 
Residual 8 2E-05 3E-06 
Total 11 0.013 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
hz aEjz -0.0101 0.001 -12.88 1E-06 -0.012 -0.008 
b» 0.0152 0.001 18.63 7E-08 0.013 
0.017 
a>Bi 0.9325 0.070 13.39 9E-07 0.772 1.093 
b, 0.0307 b,aE, 0.0312 E12 3.4311 
3| 0.9693 b^E,i -0.0019 E13 -0.1284 
b, 0.0094 3th, -0.0283 E21 -0.0286 
as 0.9906 b^S, O.OOOl E23 0.0081 
b> 0.0152 a!E-, -0.9325 E31 
-0.9468 
a, 0.9848 bjaiEj 0.0101 E32 1.0991 
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Yi Multiplier 0.15 Pi 1.00 
Y2 Multiplier 1.00 Pi 1.00 
Yi Multiplier 0.15 Pi 1.00 
(12.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.001 3E-04 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 7E-06 9E-07 
Total 11 0.001 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b, 0.0230 0.001 18.7 7E-08 0.020 0.026 
tfc aEu -0.0234 0.002 -13.8 7E-07 -0.027 -0.019 
D,aE„ 0.0014 4E-04 3.532 0.O08 5E-04 0.002 
(12.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.847 
Standard Error 5E-04 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Reßression 3 8E-05 3E-05 117 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b, 0.0094 2E-04 40.62 IE-10 0.009 0.010 
biaiEj, -0.0001 2E-04 -0.510 0.624 -0.001 4E-04 
a&, 0.0378 0.027 1.389 0.202 -0.025 0.100 
(12.C) 
Multiple R 0.999 
R Square 0.998 
Adjusted R Square 0.873 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.007 0.002 1498 3E-10 
Residual 8 1E-05 2E-06 
Total 11 0.007 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
fee a.E)z ■0.0076 0.001 -12.9 IE-06 -0.009 -0.006 
h> 0.0114 0.001 18.6 7E-08 0.010 0.013 
a>Bi 0.9325 0.070 13.4 9E-07 0.772 1.093 
bi 0.0230 biaEi 0.0234 E12 2.5531 
a, 0.9770 b,a,E, -0.0014 E13 -0.1274 
b, 0.0094 ajS, -0.0378 E2I -0.0381 
a* 0.9906 b,a.E,, 0.0001 E23 0.0108 
b, 0.0114 a>5] -0.9325 E31 -0.9432 
a. 0.9886 b^5i 0.0076 E32 0.8211 
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Yi Multiplier 0.10 Pi 1.00 
Y2 Multiplier 1.00 Pi 1.00 
Y, Multiplier 0.10 P, 1.00 
(12.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 4E-04 IE-04 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 3E-06 4E-07 
Total 11 4E-04 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b. 0.0154 0.001 18.66 7E-08 0.013 0.017 
bja.E,; -0.0156 0.001 -13.82 7E-07 -0.018 -0.013 
t» a En 0.0009 3E-04 3.532 0.008 3E-04 0.002 
(12.B1 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Sauare 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.847 
Standard Error 5E-04 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-05 117 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
hi 0.0094 2E-04 40.62 IE-10 0.009 0.010 
bj^E,, -0.0001 2E-04 -0.510 0.624 -0.001 4E-04 
azEu 0.0566 0.041 1.389 0.202 -0.037 0.151 
(12.CT 
Multiple R 0.999 
R Square 0.998 
Adjusted R Square 0.873 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.003 0.001 1498 3E-10 
Residual 8 6E-06 7E-07 
Total 11 0.003 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
toaEn -0.0051 4E-04 -12.88 1E-06 -0.006 -0.004 
b, 0.0076 4E-04 18.63 7E-08 0.007 0.009 
ajBi 0.9325 0.070 13.39 9E-07 0.772 1.093 
b, 0.0154 bi»E, 0.0156 E12 1.6888 
3| 0.9846 b,a,E,, -0.0009 E13 -0.1264 
b, 0.0094 ajBi -0.0566 E21 -0.0572 
a* 0.9906 b,%E.i 0.0001 E23 0.0162 
b, 0.0076 a>E,i -0.9325 E31 ■0.9396 
a5 0.9924 b.a.E;, 0.0051 E32 0.5453 
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Yi Multiplier 0.15 Pi 1.00 
Yj Multiplier 1.00 P: 1.50 
Yi Multiplier 0.15 P> 0.75 
(12.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.001 3E-04 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 7E-06 9E-07 
Total 11 0.001 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b, 0.0230 0.001 18.66 7E-08 0.020 0.026 
tea Ei; -0.0351 0.003 -13.82 7E-07 -0.041 -0.029 
b,aE„ 0.0011 3E-04 3.532 0.008 4E-04 0.002 
(12.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.847 
Standard Error 5E-04 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-05 117 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b. 0.0141 3E-04 40.62 IE-10 0.013 0.015 
b,*E„ -0.0001 2E-04 •0.510 0.624 -0.001 3E-04 
3l5l 0.0378 0.027 1.389 0.202 -0.025 0.100 
(12.C) 
Multiple R 0.999 
R Square 0.998 
Adiusted R Square 0.873 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.007 0.002 1498 3E-10 
Residual 8 1E-05 2E-06 
Total 11 0.007 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
hiaEM -0.0114 0.001 -12.88 1E-06 -0.013 -0.009 
b, 0.0085 5E-04 18.63 7E-08 0.007 0.010 
a>Bi 0.9325 0.070 13.39 9E-07 0.772 1.093 
bi 0.0230 b:a Hz 0.0351 E12 2.5531 
ai 0.9770 b,aE, -0.0011 E13 -0.1274 
b, 0.0141 a,6, -0.0378 E21 -0.0383 
3j 0.9859 b,*5i 0.0001 E23 0.0108 
b, 0.0085 a>5i -0.9325 E31 •0.9405 
a, 0.9915 b^E,, 0.0114 E32 0.8188 
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Yi Multiplier 0.15 Pi 1.00 
Yj Multiplier 1.00 P. 2.00 
Yi Multiplier 0.15 P! 0.50 
(12.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.001 3E-04 330 7E-08 
8 7E-06 9E-07 
Total 11 0.001 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Unoer 95% 
b. 0.0230 0.001 18.66 7E-08 0.020 0.026 
02 aEu -0.0468 0.003 ■ 13.82 7E-07 -0.055 -0.039 
b,aE„ 0.0007 2E-04 3.532 0.008 2E-04 0.001 
(12.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.847 
Standard Error 5E-04 
df SS MS F Significance F 
3 8E-05 3E-05 117 2E-06 
8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
b, 0.0187 5E-04 40.62 IE-10 0.018 0.020 
b>*E« -0.0001 IE-04 -0.510 0.624 -3E-04 2E-04 
*&l 0.0378 0.027 1.389 0.202 -0.025 0.100 
(12.C) 
Multiple R 0.999 
R Square 0.998 
Adiusted R Square 0.873 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.007 0.002 1498 3E-10 
Residual 8 IE-05 2E-06 
Total 11 0.007 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
bzaEn -0.0152 0.001 -12.88 1E-06 -0.018 -0.012 
b> 0.0057 3E-04 18.63 7E-08 0.005 0.006 
ajBi 0.9325 0.070 13.39 9E-07 0.772 1.093 
bi 0.0230 biaiBi 0.0468 E12 2.5531 
0.9770 b,a,E, -0.0007 E13 -0.1274 
b, 0.0187 ajS.1 -0.0378 E21 -0.0385 
aj 0.9813 bj%5> 0.0001 E23 0.0109 
b, 0.0057 »i5i -0.9325 E31 -0.9378 
3, 0.9943 M5i 0.0152 E32 0.8164 
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7. 
Y> Multiplier 0.15 Pi 1.00 
Y, Multiplier 1.00 P, 0.50 
Y, Multiplier 0.15 P, 2.00 
(12.A) 
Multiple R 0.996 
R Square 0.992 
Adjusted R Square 0.865 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regresä on 3 0.001 3E-04 330 7E-08 
Residual 8 7E-06 9E-07 
Total 11 0.001 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
bi 0.0230 0.001 18.66 7E-08 0.020 0.026 
ME,, •0.0117 0.001 -13.82 7E-07 -0.014 -0.010 
bi aEn 0.0028 0.001 3.532 0.008 0.001 0.005 
(12.B) 
Multiple R 0.989 
R Square 0.978 
Adjusted R Square 0.847 
Standard Error 5E-04 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 8E-05 3E-05 117 2E-06 
Residual 8 2E-06 2E-07 
Total 11 9E-05 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
be 0.0047 1E-04 40.62 IE-10 0.004 0.005 
b>a.Ej, -0.0002 5E-04 -0.510 0.624 -0.001 0.001 
aiEn 0.0378 0.027 1.389 0.202 -0.025 0.100 
(12.C) 
Multiple R 0.999 
R Square 0.998 
Adjusted R Square 0.873 
Standard Error 0.001 
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 0.007 0.002 1498 3E-10 
Residual 8 IE-05 2E-06 
Total 11 0.O07 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
baa&2 -0.0038 3E-04 -12.88 1E-06 -0.004 -0.003 
b> 0.0227 0.001 18.63 7E-08 0.020 0.026 
ajBl 0.9325 0.070 13.39 9E-07 0.772 1.093 
b, 0.0230 b,a,E, 0.0117 E12 2.5531 
a> 0.9770 b,a,E., -0.0028 E13 -0.1274 
b, 0.0047 a.5i -0.0378 E21 -0.0379 
a* 0.9953 b,a,E;, 0.0002 E23 0.0107 
b, 0.0227 ajEii -0.9325 E31 -0.9542 
ai 0.9773 bia,Eü 0.0038 E32 0.8307 
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